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Part One of this series was a refresher on the Microeconomics of Rent Control and touched on how it encourages hoarding Part Two discussed rent controls influence on the black market for apartments, rental property deterioration and housing discrimination. Here in Part Three, we will discuss how rent control hampers mobility, regional growth, tax revenue, apartment development, and becomes a catalyst for class conflict. Mobility As mentioned in Rent Control Part One, duration of residence in a rent-controlled apartment has been observed to be three times as long as duration at market-rate apartments. One can see that the incentive to hoard rent-controlled apartments is also disincentive to relocate. The mobility of both the tenants and newcomers are drastically hampered by rent control. Unless the tenant has the money to rent a second apartment (or Governor’s mansion), it will be difficult for him to relocate closer to better employment. The tenant may rather endure a very long commute in order to maintain the rent-controlled apartment. As Walter Block put it, "They are, in a sense, trapped by the gentle and visible hand that keeps them where they are rather than where they might do better." Difficulties are multiplied if the local economy takes a turn for the worse. A downturn in local employment would not be relieved by people relocating for jobs, thus making the unemployment and poverty situation worse. Employees looking to relocate in the city with rent control are hurt the worst as they will have a difficult time finding available apartments. The drawbacks to the local economy are discussed in the section on regional growth and adaptation. The reduction in mobility is especially burdensome on families with children, since public schools tend to be local. If the local school is under performing, a family under rent-control will lose […]
With New York’s new Governor’s rent subsidized by his landlord and California debating the best ways to end rent control through Proposition 98, I thought it was a good opportunity to discuss the negative aspects of rent control. This post is the second in a four part series on the rent control. Read all four posts: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions Black Market and Deceptive Acts As current renters hoard their rent-controlled apartments, it is rare that new apartments become available. Sometimes, tenants would illegally sublet their units at higher rents. Landlords do under-the table deals or rent to friends and family. New York had to crack down on landlords charging “key fees” as high as several thousand dollars to new renters. Landlords will often find loopholes that will let them de-regulate a building, just to be released of the financial burdens. For example, in NY landlords will take their rent-controlled building and deregulate it by using the entire building as a residence for a certain number of years. This is space that could otherwise have been rented at a market rate. Deterioration of Existing Housing Stock Because of the disincentive to improve and maintain the property, landlords will often become slumlords and allow unhealthy conditions or activities to take place in the apartments. This lack of improvement not only is unpleasant to the current renter, but accelerates the end of the usable life of the aparment building. The Rand Corporation studied Los Angeles’ rent control law and found that 63 percent of the benefit of lowered rents was offset by a loss in available housing related to deterioration and […]
NBC5 has an update listing the people involved and video here: New Corruption Charges Hit Building, Zoning Departments Chicago Tribune: U.S. to announce charges against 15 in city bribe-taking probe (thanks to Dan M. for the tip) Federal authorities are set to announce charges Thursday against 15 people, including seven City of Chicago employees, after an investigation into bribe-taking at the city’s Zoning and Building Departments. City Hall’s zoning process is the subject of the Tribune’s ongoing “Neighborhood for Sale” series. The stories detail how millions of dollars in campaign donations greased zoning changes that transformed the city during the real estate boom of the past decade. What’s scary is that land use is so regulated and the stakes are so high, that developers have to bribe government employees in order to exercise their own property rights. But, that’s how it works: politicians downzone areas, knowing that developers will have to scratch the politicians’ backs to build what the market tells them. There’s often the added political bonus of downzoning to pander to NIMBY factions. The downzoning creates a barrier to entry so that only the developers who are politically savvy can get things done. (see Tony Rezko) It makes the whole planning/development system corrupt. Should we be a bit surprised bribery is happening?
Developer, Al Friedman plans to build a “green” parking garage in Chicago’s Streeterville neighborhood, where development has replaced many surface lots. (Crain’s) Environmentally speaking, it’s probably better than a surface lot and frees up more space for productive development. But, can the structure itself being green offset the environmental effects of the cars using it? Is this a lesser of evils? Or is making a parking structure “green” a wasted effort? What do you think?
photo by flickr user paytonc The National Trust for Historic Preservation announced that New York City’s Lower East Side, famous for it’s history of tenements and slums, is one of 11 architectural, cultural, and natural heritage sites that are most at risk “for destruction or irreparable damage.” By “damage”, they mean new luxury towers filled with wealthy people, replacing aged tenements filled with yuppies and hipsters. From the NY Sun: ‘Endangered’ Is Designation as Lower East Side Waxes Professor of Urban Policy and Planning at New York University, Mitchell Moss: “The overall neighborhood is witnessing a transformation. And just as young people move into that area, I certainly hope they are not planning to bring back historically dangerous conditions like cholera, typhoid, and open sewers,” Of course, this comes with downzoning, which will limit supply, drive up rent and land prices, and increase the incentive to tear down more buildings. Thus, quickening demolitions and gentrification. I can understand protecting a few particular locations or buildings, but to downzone the entire area will put a huge burden on the City’s housing supply. Also, Curbed: The Lower East Side is an Endangered Species
This post has been released as the first in a four part series: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hoarding Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part Four: Conclusion and Solutions Opposition to rent control among economists spans the political spectrum, including over 90% of American and Canadian economists. In fact, Swedish socialist Economist Assar Lindbeck famously said, “In many cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city—except for bombing it.” (Assar Lindbeck, The Political Economy of the New Left, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 39) Without getting into the morality of restrictions on property rights, I will discuss the more subtle consequences of rent control over a series of posts. Quick Microeconomics Lesson: As stated by the National Multi Housing Council: Rents serve two functions essential to the efficient operation of housing markets: they compensate providers of existing housing units and developers of new units for the cost of providing shelter to consumers; and they provide the economic incentives needed to attract new investment in rental housing, as well as to maintain existing housing stock. In this respect, housing is no different from other commodities, such as food and clothing — the amount producers supply is directly related to the prevailing market price. Those of us who have studied microeconomics understand the near-universally accepted supply/demand consequence of rent-control: a decrease in the quality and supply of rental housing over time. But, for those who need a refresher or quick intro lesson, Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University and the popular Marginal Revolution blog explains the microeconomics of rent control in this video: When you have some spare time, watch this more […]
From Toll Road News: With a bid of $12.8 billion an Abertis/Citi team has been selected as the concessionaire in a 75 year lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The bids were received in a second round of best-&-final offer bids last Friday (May 16). #2 bidder was Transurban/Goldman Sachs at $12.1b. With this kind of cash, it’s going to be very tempting for more states to privatize to keep budgets afloat. I worry about how much wasteful spending today’s politicians plan to do after they get this windfall. It’s also a shame it’s a 75 year lease not a sale. This gives the state some authority to maintain some patronage, cap toll increases, and keep unions happy.
Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution is in Japan, and is fascinated by the number of vending machines. He takes a minute to ponder on the economics of vending machines in Tokyo. First we must look to the shortage of storage space in homes. I suspect few Japanese want to buy big piles of stuff at Costco. So buy smaller “portions” and in the meantime the inventories are stored in the vending machines, where they are more or less at your disposal. I would also look at the storage space for humans in stores. Shops require expensive ground floor space. If you can eliminate the space the human takes up to manage the store and space shoppers use to enter and browse, you can store more compactly. It’s seems a little counterintuitive to think that the storage space could be more valuable than a human occupant… Bill’s comment led me to add this link to an automat in NYC: BAMN!
Matthew Yglesias just posted a thought referring to a recent NY Magazine article about skyfarming: Should we build agricultural skyscrapers in-or-near our major cities? It’s certainly a cool idea. I think I’m going to put the notion that this is actually environmentally sound and feasible in my “too good to check” file. More plausibly, green roofs really are an environmentally sound idea, though not something with a good prospect for replacing farms. Check out the article, it’s very cool. Here’s my take: I think this would be really cool, but I can’t imagine this being economically feasible, except under extreme circumstances. 1. To locate this in a dense city would mean it would compete for land with the most expensive office and residential properties, where developers pay huge land prices to build in those locations. They build there because the most productive companies and individuals desire to locate there and can pay for it. The competition from farms, of all things, would drive prices for office and residential even higher. Perhaps, it might make sense to locate on less desirable urban land such as near highways or industry. 2. Construction costs of building vertical are enormous. Especially compared to the construction cost of traditional farms: nearly 0. 3. Labor costs: city labor is much more expensive than rural labor. Perhaps the skyfarm will be fully automated, but you’ll need engineers on site and other staff a typical farm does not require. 4. Traditionally, farms locate on land that is much less productive than agglomerative cities, which is why land is cheaper and farming can become profitable. Add in extraordinary construction costs, and it makes little economic sense. I can’t imagine farms competing with urban offices in productivity or profit per square foot. 5. The skyfarm probably isn’t so good for […]
Paul Krugman wrote an op-ed this morning how the US living and transportation patterns will not cope with high oil prices as well as European cities: Changing the geography of American metropolitan areas will be hard. For one thing, houses last a lot longer than cars. Long after today’s S.U.V.’s have become antique collectors’ items, millions of people will still be living in subdivisions built when gas was $1.50 or less a gallon. Infrastructure is another problem. Public transit, in particular, faces a chicken-and-egg problem: it’s hard to justify transit systems unless there’s sufficient population density, yet it’s hard to persuade people to live in denser neighborhoods unless they come with the advantage of transit access. Over the long-run the US can adapt it’s living patterns to expensive oil by curbing it’s habit of subsidizing roadways. However, only if density restrictions soften accordingly. If drivers were responsible for the full costs of their location and transportation decisions, they would gradually locate to more European-like locations. This will naturally increase the demand for transit. Private investment and entrepreneurship under such conditions should be able to provide innovative solutions to the chicken-and egg problem Krugman is concerned about.