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Michael Lewyn

Michael Lewyn

  • Joined: May 21, 2025
  • Articles: 123

The conspiracy theory of rent increases

An article in Curbed by Lane Brown has gotten much publicity in Twitter.  The article makes two factual claims: 1) New York City is still losing households, and thus there was no reason for rents to go back up in 2021-22; and 2) landlords are conspiring to keep supply down because some apartments are still vacant. Since the city seems extremely busy to me, the first claim seemed a bit insane.  But having said that, I live in touristy Midtown Manhattan two blocks from Central Park, so my experience is probably not an argument-settler.  Brown relies on U.S. Postal Service change of address data.  Brown reasons: more people filed change of address forms to move out of the city than filed change of address forms to move into the city.  Thus, the city is continuing to lose people.  But as Brown himself admits, change-of-address data misses a lot. He admits that this data “misses [moves] to the city from abroad.”  Because of COVID-related travel bans, immigration presumably declined in 2020.  But legal immigration has rebounded to pre-COVID levels, and some of that increase may have spilled over into New York.  Change-of-address data might not include recent graduates and other people who left their parents elsewhere in the U.S. to move into the city, because those people might still be getting mail at their parents’ houses.    Such data also might not reflect people who left the city temporarily in 2020 but didn’t bother with change-of-address requests because they still picked up mail at their old homes. Most importantly,  change-of-address trends do not reflect people deciding to leave roommates and get their own apartments, at least not if people changed addresses within the city.  This means that even if population is stable or declining, the number of households looking for apartments […]

Herbert Hoover reconsidered

In recent years, I have thought of Herbert Hoover as sort of an urban policy villian, thanks to his promotion of zoning. But I recently ran across one of his memoirs in our school’s library. (Hoover’s memoirs were a multivolume set, and this particular volume related to his service as Secretary of Commerce and President). Hoover devotes less than a page zoning, noting that it was designed “to protect home owners from business and factory encroachment into residential areas.” He doesn’t mention the parts of zoning that have stunted housing supply in recent decades, such as the prohibition of apartments in homeowner zones, and minimum lot sizes. In fact, he brags about increases in housing construction when he was Secretary of Commerce, writing that “The period of 1922-28 showed an increase in detached homes and in better apartments unparalleled in American history prior to that time.” In particular, he notes that 449,000 dwelling units were built in 1921, and that this number rose to 753,000 in 1928. He claims some of the credit for this, primarily because the Commerce Department helped formulate a standard building code which he believed would be less costly than existing local codes, and because the Department sought to lower interest rates on second mortgages. One common argument against new housing is that because some new housing has been built, therefore there has been a building boom sufficient to meet demand. By contrast, Hoover was not a believer in the idea that any housing construction equals enough housing construction; he notes that “The normal minimum need of the country to replace worn-out or destroyed dwellings and to provide for increased population was estimated by the Department at 400,000-500,000 dwelling units per annum.”* *By the way you might be wondering how these numbers compare to current levels […]

YIMBYs and liberals

The pro-housing movement (more colloquially known as “YIMBYs” as an acronym for “Yes In My Back Yard” can’t catch a break from either the Left or the Right. On the Left, pundits like to “expose” them as supporters of big business. But conservatives don’t always embrace YIMBYs either; both on this page and on Planetizen I have discussed conservatives who are lukewarm about zoning reform. So are YIMBYs liberals or libertarians? I have been at least somewhat active in New York’s YIMBY group, Open New York, for the past few years. There are some center-right people in the group, but my sense is that the membership tends to be more liberal than not, and that many members are more likely than I am to support regulations designed to protect tenants from landlords. Why might this be? First, New York City is to the left of the nation, and the most expensive and highly educated parts of the city (i.e. Manhattan and Brownstone Brooklyn) are especially liberal. So naturally, any organization (other than one focused on conservative policies) is going to have more liberals than conservatives. If there were YIMBY groups in more conservative places, they would probably be less liberal-dominated. Second, Open New York tends to be dominated by people under 50; older people are more likely to have purchased houses or condos, and thus aren’t really that interested in lower rents. In recent decades, younger voters have been well to the Left of older voters. So naturally, our group leans a bit left. Third, New York is dominated by the Democratic Party, and our city’s Democrats have arguably swung to the left over the past decade or so; a group that takes conservative positions is not going to find it easy to build coalitions or to get the attention […]

An Anti-Anti-NIMBY article

During the Trump Administration, liberals sometimes criticized conservatives for being anti-anti-Trump: that is, not directly championing Trump’s more obnoxious behaviour, but devoting their energies to criticizing people who criticized him. Similarly, I’ve seen some articles recently that were anti-anti-NIMBY*: they acknowledge the need for new housing, but they try to split the difference by focusing their fire on YIMBYs.** A recent article in Governing, by Aaron Renn, is an example of this genre. Renn agrees with “building more densely in popular areas like San Francisco and the north side of Chicago, in other cities along commercial corridors, near commuter rail stops, and in suburban town centers.” Since I am all for these things, I suspect I agree with Renn far more than I disagree. But then he complains that YIMBYs “have much bigger aims” because they “want to totally eliminate any housing for exclusively single-family districts- everywhere.” What’s wrong with that? First, he says (correctly) that this would require state preemption of local zoning. And this is bad, he says, because it “would completely upend this country’s traditional approach to land use.” Here, Renn is overlooking most of American history: zoning didn’t exist for roughly the first century and a half of American history, and in some places has become far more restrictive over the last few decades. Thus, YIMBY policies are not a upending of tradition, but a return to a tradition that was destroyed in the middle and late 20th century. To the extent state preemption gives Americans more rights to build more type of housing, it would actually recreate the earlier tradition that was wiped out. Moreover, even if the status quo was a “tradition”, that doesn’t make it the best policy for the 21st century. For most of the 20th century, housing was far cheaper than […]

Would the Vienna strategy work here?

Progressives often argue that American cities should imitate Vienna’s 1920s strategy of building enormous amounts of public housing while controlling rents paid to private landlords. But a look at the birth of Vienna’s public housing system shows why that system is not easily replicated. A book supported by the city government points out that the city had an enormous housing shortage after World War I, and that the working classes “began reclaiming the land surrounding the cities” (p. 13). The city then “offered its support in the form of the redesignation and purchase of sites”. Settlers received housing in return for committing to work on the building site (id.) Obviously, this strategy cannot be replicated today; there is not a huge amount of unowned or extremely cheap land that people can just commandeer and build on, and I am not sure many people can easily become construction workers in exchange for housing. In addition, the city financed housing in ways that are not easily replicated today. The book notes that tax revenue for housing came from a 1923 “tax on housing development .. a simple working-class apartment was taxed at an average annual rate of 2.083% of its pre-war rentable value, this went up to 36.4 for luxury homes.” This might have worked in 1923 because city residents had no suburbs to flee to; however, today, city residents can easily respond to large tax increases by moving. Moreover, in 1923 there was no zoning or environmental review or “community engagement” to give Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) activists a chance to delay or prevent housing construction. Today, even if government can afford to build new housing somewhere, the bureaucratic obstacles to such housing might made it politically impossible to build in some places, or expensive and time-consuming to build […]

Louisville and density regulation

Lydia Lo and Yonah Freemark have an interesting new paper ? EditSign on zoning in Louisville on the Urban Institute website. They point out that of the land zoned for single-family housing, 59 percent is zoned R4, requiring 9000-square-foot lots, which means no more than five houses per acre. From a transportation standpoint, this is not ideal. Even the most cursory Google search reveals that a neighborhood should have at least eight or ten units per acre to support minimal bus service. This is because if only a few people live near a bus stop, only a few people will ride the bus. So Louisville’s zoning generally prohibits density high enough for decent bus service. Similarly, from a housing supply standpoint, such zoning is not ideal either. Obviously, a development with 5 houses per acre contributes less to regional housing supply than one with 10 houses per acre. Much ink has been spilled over the evils of zoning places for nothing but single-family housing. But perhaps the density of housing is just as important as its form.

Is Tokyo comparable to U.S. cities?

In his new book Arbitrary Lines, Nolan Gray points out that Tokyo is more affordable than many U.S. cities because its zoning policies are less restrictive. One common counterargument is that because Tokyo is a population-losing city in a population-losing city, it simply lacks the demand to have high housing prices, and is thus more comparable to the low-cost Rust Belt than to high-cost cities like New York. But a short look at my World Almanac suggests otherwise. On page 730, it lists the world’s largest urban areas. It shows that between 2000 and 2021 , Tokyo actually grew by 8.4 percent. By contrast, metropolitan New York-Newark grew by 5.7 percent, and Los Angeles by 5.6 percent. In other words, Tokyo’s population actually grew more rapidly than high-cost U.S. cities.

Long-term renters ARE short-term renters (maybe)

One reason local governments are often hostile to Airbnb and similar home-sharing websites is that politicians believe that the interests of short-term renters and long-term renters are opposed- that is, that Airbnb wastes housing units that could be used by long-term renters. This claim is of course based on the assumption that the interests of long-term renters are more important, because short-term renters are usually rich tourists with plenty of money to spend. If short-term rents were always as high as those of fancy hotels, this argument might make sense. But in fact, some Airbnb rents are comparable to rents in the long-term market, and some Airbnb landlords in fact will rent property for months. I discovered this while playing around with Airbnb listings in New York City. In particular, I looked at rentals for the entire month of August. I found rents as low as $827 per month (for a furnished room in Hollis, Queens). Even after limiting my search to full-fledged apartments (as opposed to sharing a room in someone’s house) I found some listings that were comparable to those in the long-term rental market. I found a listing for $1800 in Staten Island, and $1826 in Midwood (in southern Brooklyn) – far less than what I pay. The cheapest Manhattan listing (a walk-up in Murray Hill) was $2400, about what I paid before I got married. I did another search for 3-month tenacies (from Aug 1-Oct 1) and found comparable results: the cheapest fully private space rented for $1752 (in East New York) and the cheapest Manhattan listing rented for $2453. The cheapest roommate arrangement was $736- in Bensonhurst. In sum, it appears that if you can afford a traditional apartment, you can probably afford a low-end Airbnb listing- despite the regulatory obstacles that government uses against […]

Review: Homelessness is a Housing Problem

In Homelessness is a Housing Problem, Prof. Gregg Colburn and data scientist Clayton Page Aldern seek to answer the question: why is homelessness much more common in some cities than in others? They find that only two factors are significant: 1) overall rents and 2) rental vacancy rates. Where housing is scarce and rents are high, lots of people are homeless. Where rents are lower, fewer people are homeless, even in very poor places. (In fact, high city incomes correlate positively with homelessness, because more and better jobs lead to higher demand for housing). By contrast, many other factors that one might think are related to homelessness in fact are not correlated on a citywide basis. For example, since homeless people are generally poor, one might think that places with high poverty rates or high unemployment rates have lots of homelessness. The authors show that this is not the case. Where most people are poor, there is less demand for housing, which translates into lower rents and less homelessness. One might also think that places with warm weather have lots of homelessness, because homeless people might be attracted to them. But high-rent cold cities like Boston have above-average levels of homelessness, while cheaper warm-weather cities like Orlando and Charlotte do not. However, homeless people are more likely to have temporary shelter in cold cities than in expensive warm-weather cities like San Diego- either because city governments are less motivated to build homeless shelters when no one is at risk of freezing to death, or because the homeless themselves are less eager to use shelters. I suspect that if the authors focused only on highly visible unsheltered homelessness, they might have found a stronger correlation with weather). It might be argued that shelters themselves (or other social services) attract the destitute. […]

Reasons to be a Census skeptic

Over the past week, the press was chock full of 2020-style headlines like “Census Bureau Confirms Pandemic Exodus from SF.” That’s because according to the Census Bureau, virtually every urban county in the U.S. (even urban counties in growing metros like Dallas and Atlanta) lost population between July 2020 and July 2021. But is the hype justified? I suspect not, for a variety of reasons. First of all, Census Department estimates have, in recent years, tended to underestimate urban populations, at least in some cities. For example, in 2019 the Census estimated Manhattan’s population as 1.628 million, while the actual count of 2020 showed 1.694 million residents- an underestimation of over 65,000 people. The Census estimated Brooklyn’s population at 2.559 million, but the actual count showed 2.736 million- an underestimate of over 150,000. (On the other hand, the 2020 population count was actually a bit lower than the 2019 estimates for Washington and San Francisco). Second, even the 2020 Census probably undercounted cities more than it undercounted suburbs. How do we know this? Because according to the Census Bureau itself, it undercounted Blacks by 3 percent and Hispanics by 5 percent, while slightly overcounting whites. These groups tend to be more urban than suburban (at least compared to whites) – so if the Census undercounted these groups, it probably undercounted urban population generally. Third, the timing of the Census Bureau’s estimates does not quite make sense to me. By July 2021, rents had already began to rise in Manhattan; the low rents of February and March were already disappearing. This suggests that by July, population (and thus demand) was increasing. Fourth, even if the Census Bureau’s population estimates were valid for the summer of 2021, they certainly aren’t valid any more. How do we know? It seems pretty obvious that […]

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