Over 200 Illegal Hotel Buildings in NYC

From AMNY: Report: 200 illegal hotels exist in the city There are more than 200 apartment buildings in the city that have been illegally converted to hotels, according to a report released Sunday, significantly reducing the number of rent-stabilized units available. … Illegal hotel operators frequently take advantage of tax loopholes designed to encourage the construction of residential units, according to Raskin. … Advocates are calling for increased penalties and changes in the zoning laws to clarify where hotels can and cannot operate. And today’s Sun: Crackdown Sought on Illegal Hotels in the City What does this tell us about the housing/hotel markets? It seems to me that tax structures (and probably zoning) favor housing, while there is significant unmet demand for hotel rooms. Nonetheless, there is definitely a shortage of built space in NYC, which could be better accommodated by loosening zoning restrictions on new development. Any other thoughts?

Mixed Incentives and the True Costs of Driving

From the Freakonomic Blog – Mixed Messages on Auto Use: We wrote not long ago about the various negative externalities produced by driving — congestion, pollution, accident risk, etc. — and how pay-as-you-drive insurance might help impose the true cost of driving on each driver. … And here’s another case of mixed messages on auto use, or at least mixed incentives: The U.S. Department of Transportation has issued a press release saying that Americans have started to drive considerably fewer miles than before. And here’s another case of mixed messages on auto use, or at least mixed incentives: The U.S. Department of Transportation has issued a press release saying that Americans have started to drive considerably fewer miles than before. This post and the comments made me think about how little people actually think about the full costs of driving. People don’t typically think about the wear and tear on their car or the depreciation as they put on miles. The IRS’ mileage rates are intended to reflect these costs on top of the costs of gas, but many people think they are getting reimbursed extra for their mileage. Sure, if you are driving an older, fuel-efficient car, you’ll make money on your business travel… What if drivers were to pay the full costs of the roads they use? Would they start to look at the full cost of driving choices?

Market Incentives to Conserve Resources

The economics blog, Knowledge Problem on how prices effect individuals incentive to conserve: Conservation of resources: Prices change everything Steven Stoft, at the EU Energy Policy Blog, observes that market driven conservation is a slow process: Conservation is the main way consumers respond to high market prices. When price goes up, consumption comes down–but it takes a while for the full price effect to play out. The market eventually shifts demand in the long run, as individuals adjust their behaviors in reaction to higher prices. To what extent will sustained high gas prices cause people to shift their location preferences towards a less gas-dependent urban lifestyle? (assuming high prices are here to stay) How long will it take for us to see a difference in where people prefer to live? Graph from the NY Times

Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions

Welcome to the final post in the series discussing the consequences of rent control. Thank you to the subscribers who have patiently awaited each new post. I hope everyone found it enlightening. If you haven’t read the entire series, you can catch up with these links: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Conclusion Rent control is not just a simple price control setting the price at which willing renters and landlords are permitted to do business, it is much worse.  It is a coercive act that gives landlords no legal option, but to rent to a tenant against his will, often at a financial loss.  Rent control adds a non-voluntary burden to landlords which deepens over time because landlords do not have the option to rent to a tenant at below market rates.  Not only does rent control cause huge distortions in the housing market, but the burdens fall disproportionately on the poor and underprivileged people it was intended to benefit. Although particular people are able to live with the comfort of low rent payments, even those renters will see their living conditions deteriorate as landlords neglect repairs and maintenance. As the situation gets worse, middle class residents are able to move away, leaving behind the poorest residents who have become reliant on the reduced rent. In effect, rent control grants property rights to renters, that originally belonged to the original property owners. Rent control becomes a redistribution of wealth to rent control tenants away from apartment owners, market apartment renters, and newcomers to the area. Nonetheless, over time the quality of life decreases for all residents of a city where rent control is imposed. Solutions So, it […]

Friday Humor: White People in Portland

Loyal reader, Bill tipped me off to this blog and I’ve subscribed to the feed ever since. Today’s post was particularly relevant: White People in the News – May 30, 2008 Isn’t this photo classic? The comments on the blog are always fun to read too…

Watch as “Expediters” Become Scapegoats of Corruption and Incompetence

It’s easier to look at the symptom: corruption, than treat the disease: government over-regulation: Chicago Tribune: Role of expediters under scrutiny as federal probe targets City Hall corruption The unsung and highly specialized role these private individuals play in the workings of city government gained notoriety last week when investigators revealed that for the last year, an expediter had been secretly recording conversations to help build an ongoing bribery case that so far has led to federal charges against 15 people. Expediters have multiplied and become fixtures at City Hall in recent years. During the height of the building boom a few years ago, the permit process stretched for many months, creating a cottage industry of people offering their expertise in the byzantine ways of the city’s zoning and building codes. These expediters will be made out as the bad guys, though most serve a valuable roll: wait in line, deal with city staff and other menial things professionals don’t want to waste valuable time doing. These guys are not squeaky clean – many expediters are people you wouldn’t want your daughter dating, but dig deeper to find the real bad guys: the bureaucrats who thrive on bad bureaucracy. The harder it is to do your business, the more it’s worth to hire someone to “expedite” the approval process. They get their kickbacks, campaign contributions, and SkyBox tickets just because they are not competent enough to get the job done quickly, and/or aren’t properly funded to do the job properly. Meanwhile, important projects are delayed, investment capital sits idle, materials wait in a warehouse, and people wait for their homes, offices, or stores to be built. Dig deeper below the surface, and you’ll see the whole crooked system of patronage, political contributions, payoffs, and deal-making fueled by government regulation, lobbying, […]

Video: Both Sides of Proposition 98

With the referendum approaching, the debate over rent control is heating up in California. This video is pretty balanced in showing both sides. There are some memorable quotes, like “social security and pension plan would not pay the market rent, so I just wouldn’t eat.” I guess this guy values his $375/mo apartment over food. Or the pro-rent-control activist who says, “If you can’t find a place now, what will it be like if we lose rent control?” Another says, “Economically, this would be devastating.” I encourage them to take microeconomics, but I think economics was banned in San Francisco. Was that Proposition 76?

Rent Control Part 3: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development and Class Conflict

Part One of this series was a refresher on the Microeconomics of Rent Control and touched on how it encourages hoarding Part Two discussed rent controls influence on the black market for apartments, rental property deterioration and housing discrimination. Here in Part Three, we will discuss how rent control hampers mobility, regional growth, tax revenue, apartment development, and becomes a catalyst for class conflict. Mobility As mentioned in Rent Control Part One, duration of residence in a rent-controlled apartment has been observed to be three times as long as duration at market-rate apartments. One can see that the incentive to hoard rent-controlled apartments is also disincentive to relocate. The mobility of both the tenants and newcomers are drastically hampered by rent control. Unless the tenant has the money to rent a second apartment (or Governor’s mansion), it will be difficult for him to relocate closer to better employment. The tenant may rather endure a very long commute in order to maintain the rent-controlled apartment. As Walter Block put it, "They are, in a sense, trapped by the gentle and visible hand that keeps them where they are rather than where they might do better." Difficulties are multiplied if the local economy takes a turn for the worse. A downturn in local employment would not be relieved by people relocating for jobs, thus making the unemployment and poverty situation worse. Employees looking to relocate in the city with rent control are hurt the worst as they will have a difficult time finding available apartments. The drawbacks to the local economy are discussed in the section on regional growth and adaptation. The reduction in mobility is especially burdensome on families with children, since public schools tend to be local. If the local school is under performing, a family under rent-control will lose […]

Rent Control Part 2: Black Market, Deterioration and Discrimination

With New York’s new Governor’s rent subsidized by his landlord and California debating the best ways to end rent control through Proposition 98, I thought it was a good opportunity to discuss the negative aspects of rent control. This post is the second in a four part series on the rent control. Read all four posts: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions Black Market and Deceptive Acts As current renters hoard their rent-controlled apartments, it is rare that new apartments become available. Sometimes, tenants would illegally sublet their units at higher rents. Landlords do under-the table deals or rent to friends and family. New York had to crack down on landlords charging “key fees” as high as several thousand dollars to new renters. Landlords will often find loopholes that will let them de-regulate a building, just to be released of the financial burdens. For example, in NY landlords will take their rent-controlled building and deregulate it by using the entire building as a residence for a certain number of years. This is space that could otherwise have been rented at a market rate. Deterioration of Existing Housing Stock Because of the disincentive to improve and maintain the property, landlords will often become slumlords and allow unhealthy conditions or activities to take place in the apartments. This lack of improvement not only is unpleasant to the current renter, but accelerates the end of the usable life of the aparment building. The Rand Corporation studied Los Angeles’ rent control law and found that 63 percent of the benefit of lowered rents was offset by a loss in available housing related to deterioration and […]