Tag rent stabilization

Rangel Now Only Hoards Three Rent Controlled Apartments

[flickr photo: aznatca68] Democratic Congressman Charlie Rangel has announced that he will vacate the rent controlled apartment he has been using as a campaign office. This apartment is just one of four rent controlled apartments he is hoarding in the Lenox Terrace apartment building in Harlem. NY Times – Rangel to Relinquish Apartment Used as Office: Representative Charles B. Rangel has decided to move his campaign office out of one of four rent-stabilized apartments he leases in Harlem, his spokesman said on Monday. One of the units — a one-bedroom apartment that he paid for with money from his re-election fund and from a political action committee — had been used as a campaign office, despite city and state guidelines that require rent-stabilized apartments to be used solely as a primary residence. Because that apartment is rent-stabilized, Mr. Rangel paid $630 per month, while similar market-rate units in the building rent for $1,700 a month and higher. Under House ethics rules, a gift is defined as any “gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment, hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having monetary value.” And some suggest that the difference between what Mr. Rangel pays for the second, third and fourth apartments and the market rate could fit that definition. . But Mr. Rangel said that it was ludicrous to consider the rent-stabilized apartments a gift because he paid rent for them. He also said that two of the units were combined by a previous tenant. Rangel should either resign or return every penny he saved by hoarding this apartment while using it as a campaign office. For this apartment alone, that should be $1,000 per month for as long as he has used it as a campaign office. Also: Reason – Rangel’s Down, But He’s Not Out

Congressman Rangel Legally Plunders $30,000/year in Four Rent Controlled Apartments

[update! Rangel Now Only Hoards Three Rent Controlled Apartments] In case you missed it, powerful New York Congressman Charlie Rangel has been hoarding four apartments in Harlem’s Lenox Terrace. Coincidently (perhaps not so coincidently) Lennox Terrace is the same building where New York’s Governor Patterson, Patterson’s father, former Manhattan Borough President, Percy E. Sutton, and Rangel’s Cheif of Staff, Jim Capel hoard rent-controlled (ahem, Rent Stabilized as it’s referred to by NY politicians) apartments. Not only does Rangel have four rent-controlled apartments in the building, but he has been using one of those apartments as a campaign office! [flickr photo: jschumacher] New York Times – Rangel Defends Use of Rent-Stabilized Apartments: The Times reported on Friday that Mr. Rangel has four rent-stabilized apartments at Lenox Terrace, including three adjacent units on the 16th floor overlooking Upper Manhattan, in a building owned by one of New York’s premier real estate developers. (The apartment is featured in “Style and Grace: African Americans at Home,” a book published by Bulfinch Press.) Mr. Rangel, the powerful Democrat who is chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, uses his fourth apartment, six floors below, as a campaign office, despite state and city regulations that require rent-stabilized apartments to be used as a primary residence. Mr. Rangel, who has a net worth of $566,000 to $1.2 million, according to Congressional disclosure records, paid a total rent of $3,894 monthly in 2007 for the four apartments at Lenox Terrace, a 1,700-unit luxury development of six towers, with doormen, that is described in real estate publications as Harlem’s most prestigious address. The current market-rate rent for similar apartments in Mr. Rangel’s building would total $7,465 to $8,125 a month, according to the Web site of the owner, the Olnick Organization. The use of multiple apartments that might […]

Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions

Welcome to the final post in the series discussing the consequences of rent control. Thank you to the subscribers who have patiently awaited each new post. I hope everyone found it enlightening. If you haven’t read the entire series, you can catch up with these links: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Conclusion Rent control is not just a simple price control setting the price at which willing renters and landlords are permitted to do business, it is much worse.  It is a coercive act that gives landlords no legal option, but to rent to a tenant against his will, often at a financial loss.  Rent control adds a non-voluntary burden to landlords which deepens over time because landlords do not have the option to rent to a tenant at below market rates.  Not only does rent control cause huge distortions in the housing market, but the burdens fall disproportionately on the poor and underprivileged people it was intended to benefit. Although particular people are able to live with the comfort of low rent payments, even those renters will see their living conditions deteriorate as landlords neglect repairs and maintenance. As the situation gets worse, middle class residents are able to move away, leaving behind the poorest residents who have become reliant on the reduced rent. In effect, rent control grants property rights to renters, that originally belonged to the original property owners. Rent control becomes a redistribution of wealth to rent control tenants away from apartment owners, market apartment renters, and newcomers to the area. Nonetheless, over time the quality of life decreases for all residents of a city where rent control is imposed. Solutions So, it […]

Rent Control Part 3: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development and Class Conflict

Part One of this series was a refresher on the Microeconomics of Rent Control and touched on how it encourages hoarding Part Two discussed rent controls influence on the black market for apartments, rental property deterioration and housing discrimination. Here in Part Three, we will discuss how rent control hampers mobility, regional growth, tax revenue, apartment development, and becomes a catalyst for class conflict. Mobility As mentioned in Rent Control Part One, duration of residence in a rent-controlled apartment has been observed to be three times as long as duration at market-rate apartments. One can see that the incentive to hoard rent-controlled apartments is also disincentive to relocate. The mobility of both the tenants and newcomers are drastically hampered by rent control. Unless the tenant has the money to rent a second apartment (or Governor’s mansion), it will be difficult for him to relocate closer to better employment. The tenant may rather endure a very long commute in order to maintain the rent-controlled apartment. As Walter Block put it, "They are, in a sense, trapped by the gentle and visible hand that keeps them where they are rather than where they might do better." Difficulties are multiplied if the local economy takes a turn for the worse. A downturn in local employment would not be relieved by people relocating for jobs, thus making the unemployment and poverty situation worse. Employees looking to relocate in the city with rent control are hurt the worst as they will have a difficult time finding available apartments. The drawbacks to the local economy are discussed in the section on regional growth and adaptation. The reduction in mobility is especially burdensome on families with children, since public schools tend to be local. If the local school is under performing, a family under rent-control will lose […]

Rent Control Part 2: Black Market, Deterioration and Discrimination

With New York’s new Governor’s rent subsidized by his landlord and California debating the best ways to end rent control through Proposition 98, I thought it was a good opportunity to discuss the negative aspects of rent control. This post is the second in a four part series on the rent control. Read all four posts: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions Black Market and Deceptive Acts As current renters hoard their rent-controlled apartments, it is rare that new apartments become available. Sometimes, tenants would illegally sublet their units at higher rents. Landlords do under-the table deals or rent to friends and family. New York had to crack down on landlords charging “key fees” as high as several thousand dollars to new renters. Landlords will often find loopholes that will let them de-regulate a building, just to be released of the financial burdens. For example, in NY landlords will take their rent-controlled building and deregulate it by using the entire building as a residence for a certain number of years. This is space that could otherwise have been rented at a market rate. Deterioration of Existing Housing Stock Because of the disincentive to improve and maintain the property, landlords will often become slumlords and allow unhealthy conditions or activities to take place in the apartments. This lack of improvement not only is unpleasant to the current renter, but accelerates the end of the usable life of the aparment building. The Rand Corporation studied Los Angeles’ rent control law and found that 63 percent of the benefit of lowered rents was offset by a loss in available housing related to deterioration and […]

Rent Control Part 1: Microeconomics Lesson & Hoarding

This post has been released as the first in a four part series: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hoarding Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part Four: Conclusion and Solutions Opposition to rent control among economists spans the political spectrum, including over 90% of American and Canadian economists.  In fact, Swedish socialist Economist Assar Lindbeck famously said, “In many cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city—except for bombing it.” (Assar Lindbeck, The Political Economy of the New Left, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 39) Without getting into the morality of restrictions on property rights, I will discuss the more subtle consequences of rent control over a series of posts. Quick Microeconomics Lesson: As stated by the National Multi Housing Council: Rents serve two functions essential to the efficient operation of housing markets: they compensate providers of existing housing units and developers of new units for the cost of providing shelter to consumers; and they provide the economic incentives needed to attract new investment in rental housing, as well as to maintain existing housing stock. In this respect, housing is no different from other commodities, such as food and clothing — the amount producers supply is directly related to the prevailing market price. Those of us who have studied microeconomics understand the near-universally accepted supply/demand consequence of rent-control: a decrease in the quality and supply of rental housing over time. But, for those who need a refresher or quick intro lesson, Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University and the popular Marginal Revolution blog explains the microeconomics of rent control in this video: When you have some spare time, watch this more […]

NY Gov. Patterson’s Rent-Stabilized Apartment in Harlem

NY Sun: Paterson Pays A Stabilized Rate of Rent The governor of New York pays about $1,250 a month for a two-bedroom, rent-stabilized apartment in central Harlem, even while owning a home upstate in Guilderland and having unfettered access to the 40-room Governor’s Mansion in Albany. Governor Paterson and his wife, Michelle, made about $270,000 last year, according to their tax returns. This is a classic example of hoarding. He should be ashamed of his Lenox Terrace apartment that someone would gladly pay market rate to rent, but seems to think it’s ok. Can’t we at least deregulate apartments when the inhabitant can afford to live in a market-rate apartment? I hope the media pays attention to this, and properly scrutinizes the dark-side of rent regulation.

Release Us From Rent Regulation

Curbed: Rent-Stabilzation War: Tenants Strike Back New York Times: Questions of Rent Tactics by Private Equity Rent-regulated apartments account for 57 percent of the total in the Bronx, 42 percent of the apartments in Brooklyn, 59 percent in Manhattan, 43 percent in Queens and 15 percent of those on Staten Island, the Guidelines Board says. There’s a long way to go. Phasing out the free ride won’t be painless or popular, but New York needs to let the marketplace decide what rents should be and where people locate. By freeing-up units to the marketplace, much of the current supply constraints can be alleviated and rents won’t skyrocket as drastically on the market-rent payers. Not only that, the beneficiaries of the regulation have had a disincentive to relocate closer to better jobs and affordable areas since they don’t want to give up their sweet deal. Rent price control and the resulting supply constraint is more guilty than zoning restrictions in driving up market rents throughout New York. Under the current regulations, some landlords pay more to their lenders than they collect from tenants of rent-regulated apartments. This helps explain the scale of the wealth transfer to each renter: Vantage’s debt service is an estimated $1,098 monthly on each unit, almost 50 percent more than the average rent. Learn more about the consequences of rent control in a informational series here: Rent Control Part 1: Microeconomics Lesson & Hoarding