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Tag property taxes

Detroit: LVT would fix that

In a recent Mackinac Policy conference, Detroit’s Mayor Mike Dugan proposed *drum roll* a land value tax. Sort of. Mayor Dugan’s proposal would create separate tax rates for land and capital improvements (i.e. the buildings on top). Specifically, he wants to decrease the tax rate on buildings by ~30% and increase rates on land by ~300%. The change would increase revenue for the city and also cause a series of second order effects. Taxing Blight & Rewarding Investment Detroit’s existing tax structure disincentives development. Holding vacant land or land with dilapidated (i.e. assessed as worthless) structures is cheap from a tax perspective. Actually developing land triggers a tax increase because of the brand new structure who’s value gets figured into the tax bill. What’s worse, the existing tax system encourages land hoarding. Land speculators sit on neglected parcels on the off chance that a developer needs it as part of a larger project. To caveat that, though, not all land speculation is bad. Holding some land off market and releasing it later into a development cycle can have positive benefits. In Detroit’s case, however, these are mostly vacant lots and abandoned buildings creating public health hazards the city has to deal with. The Political Economy of Land Value Taxation Unexpectedly – for me as a latte sipping coastal urbanite in California – Dugan’s LVT would also lower tax bills for homeowners. Land values in Detroit are low — in absolute terms and relative to structure values. Making the shift to taxing the less valuable land component of a property nets out positive for most homeowners. And the fact that it’s a win for homeowners makes me think it’s politically viable, both in Detroit and elsewhere. In places struggling to get back on a growth footing — places where land values […]

Why Money for Schools Means No Permits For Housing

Housing has a lot going against it in the California. But amidst all the legal, political, and regulatory roadblocks, there’s one law that sneaks by largely unnoticed: Prop 98. Prop 98 guarantees a minimum level of state spending on education each year. Sacramento pools most city, county, and special district property taxes into special education funds to meet this commitment. The localities only get to keep a small part of the property tax revenues for their own general budgets. This system creates a disincentive for cities to permit housing. New housing brings in new residents who need city services. But it doesn’t bring in a commensurate increase in property taxes since most of that revenue gets scooped up by Sacramento. Commercial development, though, brings in taxes a city gets to keep. Sales and hotel taxes are significant revenue streams. And they don’t cause the kinds of strain on city services that new residential does. Reforming Prop 98 might be low hanging fruit. Changing the formula to appropriate a broader stream of city revenues might help ease the bias against housing. And it might even be possible to amend the law without having to fight the California Teachers Association. As long as there’s no net decrease in education funding, of course.   It’s tough to say exactly how much new housing Prop 98 actually prevents. Different cities get to keep different amounts of their property taxes, so the disincentive differs case to case. And there are plenty of other things like CEQA and Prop 13 which put a drag on new construction as well. But where CEQA and Prop 13 make it easier for residents who are already NIMBYs to gum up the works, Prop 98 is a reason in itself for a city to avoid residential development. So while we can’t do […]

Links

1. A report on (Western) European parking policies. Abstract of the abstract: Big on charging market rates for on-street parking, but also big on capping private developer’s ability to build parking. I’d be interested to see an analysis like this done to see if the caps are actually set lower than the market equilibrium. Streetsblog also has a good summary. 2. It’s unfortunate that this developer chose to express himself in such an unsympathetic way (someone should teach him the meaning of the word “corruption,” in particular), but his analysis of NYC’s recent property tax assessment hikes is consistent with what we’ve seen before: people who live in apartments are taxed at higher rates than people who live in single-family homes. 3. Urbanists are trying to change Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and HUD’s policies of not funding small mixed use projects. From what I understand, the GSEs’ role in financing American mortgages has actually increased in the wake of the financial crisis, so the federal bias against mixed use may actually be stronger than it was before the recession. 4. Washington, DC may speed through zoning changes that require parking to not be out front. I’m not sure, but I think that DC currently has some laws mandating that it be out front, which means this would be yet another example of zoning codes going from density-forbidding to density-forcing without any intermediate stop. 5. Remember yesterday when I said that Gallaudet was a bigger drag on its neighborhood than the industrial-looking blight nearby? DC lawmakers may try to one-up Gallaudet by replacing the buildings with a soccer stadium.

Parking lots as tax arbitrage during the Great Depression

I’ve learned a lot from Fogelson’s Downtown, but one thing that I had absolutely no idea about before I read this book was how Depression-era tax policies encouraged downtown landlords to tear down their buildings and replace them with parking lots (emphasis mine): By the mid 1930s the owners of Detroit’s Temple Theater, a nine-story office building that had once been the home of the city’s most successful vaudeville house, had had enough. In a city reeling from the Great Depression, the vacancy rate for office buildigns was running between 35 and 40 percent. With tenants hard to find – and rents, which had been falling steadily, hard to collect – the Temple Theater no long paid. In an attempt to lower property taxes and operating expenses, its owners did what other downtown property owners in Detroit and other cities had done. They demolished the building and turned the site into a parking lot. [These] were commonly referred to as “taxpayers.” The “taxpayers” were as much a legacy of the depression as the “Hoovervilles,” bread lines, soup kitches, and dance marathons. They symbolized downtown in the 1930s as much as skyscrapers, department stores, and high-rise hotels had in the 1920s. […] Things were much the same in downtown Los Angeles, where so many buildings were torn down and replaced by parking lots or “taxpayers” in the 1930s that by the early 1940s roughly 25 percent of the buildable land was used to store autos. In a business district of less than one square mile there were no more than nine hundred parking lots and garages, with space for more than sixty-five thousand cars. […] By tearing down the buildings, the owners could lower their tax bills and reduce their operating expenses. By replacing them with parking lots or one- and […]

How local property taxes discourage density

In yesterday’s post about a proposal in Philadelphia to mandate adherence to certain “visitability” standards in new residential construction, but only for multifamily units, I asked if anyone knew of any other burdens that are heaped unfairly on apartment-dwellers. Regular commenter Alon Levy rose to the task, and pointed to a huge one: property taxes. He linked to this great explanation of New York City’s arcade property tax regime that favors outer-borough owner-occupied properties over apartment and condo dwellers, but after just a little bit of digging I found that these property tax differentials are in no way unique to NYC. Here’s (most of) the abstract to a 2006 paper published in the journal Housing Policy Debate (.pdf): The study finds that for the nation as a whole, multifamily rental housing bears an effective tax rate (tax divided by property value) that is at least 18 percent higher than the rate on single-family owner-occupied housing. This gap appears to have arisen during the 1990s. The level of taxation and the apartment/house differential vary considerably by location. Much—but not all—of the differential is associated with the fact that apartments have a lower average property value per unit than houses. The residential property tax, as implemented, promotes low-density development, disproportionately burdens lower-value properties, and may impose higher taxes on apartment residents than on homeowners with identical incomes. This is on top of the fact that the vast majority of property taxes in the US are used to fund local roads and schools (right?), which apartment-dwellers surely make lesser use of. So even if the taxes were levied across the board, they’d still be redistributing wealth from poorer apartment dwellers to richer homeowners. I should also emphasize that these are local property taxes, and are completely separate from the mortgage interest deduction that […]

Rothbard the Urbanist Part 1: Public Education’s Role in Sprawl and Exclusion

I’ve been meaning to address the public education system’s complex role in land use patterns, and found that Murray Rothbard does a better job in his 1973 manifesto, For a New Liberty than I ever could.  In summary, locally-funded public education is an engine of geographical segregation, which encourages flight from urban areas, and was a driving motivation for the popular acceptance of exclusionary zoning in newer suburbs.  As a result, wealth is consistently concentrated geographically, and housing affordability is at odds with these restrictions of supply intended to exclude poorer people from draining the property tax base. Here’s a paragraph from the chapter on education: The geographical nature of the public school system has also led to a coerced pattern of residential segregation, in income and consequently in race, throughout the country and particularly in the suburbs. As everyone knows, the United States since World War II has seen an expansion of population, not in the inner central cities, but in the surrounding suburban areas. As new and younger families have moved to the suburbs, by far the largest and growing burden of local budgets has been to pay for the public schools, which have to accommodate a young population with a relatively high proportion of children per capita. These schools invariably have been financed from growing property taxation, which largely falls on the suburban residences. This means that the wealthier the suburban family, and the more expensive its home, the greater will be its tax contribution for the local school. Hence, as [p. 133] the burden of school taxes increases steadily, the suburbanites try desperately to encourage an inflow of wealthy residents and expensive homes, and to discourage an inflow of poorer citizens. There is, in short, a breakeven point of the price of a house beyond which a […]

Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions

Welcome to the final post in the series discussing the consequences of rent control. Thank you to the subscribers who have patiently awaited each new post. I hope everyone found it enlightening. If you haven’t read the entire series, you can catch up with these links: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Conclusion Rent control is not just a simple price control setting the price at which willing renters and landlords are permitted to do business, it is much worse.  It is a coercive act that gives landlords no legal option, but to rent to a tenant against his will, often at a financial loss.  Rent control adds a non-voluntary burden to landlords which deepens over time because landlords do not have the option to rent to a tenant at below market rates.  Not only does rent control cause huge distortions in the housing market, but the burdens fall disproportionately on the poor and underprivileged people it was intended to benefit. Although particular people are able to live with the comfort of low rent payments, even those renters will see their living conditions deteriorate as landlords neglect repairs and maintenance. As the situation gets worse, middle class residents are able to move away, leaving behind the poorest residents who have become reliant on the reduced rent. In effect, rent control grants property rights to renters, that originally belonged to the original property owners. Rent control becomes a redistribution of wealth to rent control tenants away from apartment owners, market apartment renters, and newcomers to the area. Nonetheless, over time the quality of life decreases for all residents of a city where rent control is imposed. Solutions So, it […]

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