Tag Economics

Market Incentives to Conserve Resources

The economics blog, Knowledge Problem on how prices effect individuals incentive to conserve: Conservation of resources: Prices change everything Steven Stoft, at the EU Energy Policy Blog, observes that market driven conservation is a slow process: Conservation is the main way consumers respond to high market prices. When price goes up, consumption comes down–but it takes a while for the full price effect to play out. The market eventually shifts demand in the long run, as individuals adjust their behaviors in reaction to higher prices. To what extent will sustained high gas prices cause people to shift their location preferences towards a less gas-dependent urban lifestyle? (assuming high prices are here to stay) How long will it take for us to see a difference in where people prefer to live? Graph from the NY Times

Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions

Welcome to the final post in the series discussing the consequences of rent control. Thank you to the subscribers who have patiently awaited each new post. I hope everyone found it enlightening. If you haven’t read the entire series, you can catch up with these links: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Conclusion Rent control is not just a simple price control setting the price at which willing renters and landlords are permitted to do business, it is much worse.  It is a coercive act that gives landlords no legal option, but to rent to a tenant against his will, often at a financial loss.  Rent control adds a non-voluntary burden to landlords which deepens over time because landlords do not have the option to rent to a tenant at below market rates.  Not only does rent control cause huge distortions in the housing market, but the burdens fall disproportionately on the poor and underprivileged people it was intended to benefit. Although particular people are able to live with the comfort of low rent payments, even those renters will see their living conditions deteriorate as landlords neglect repairs and maintenance. As the situation gets worse, middle class residents are able to move away, leaving behind the poorest residents who have become reliant on the reduced rent. In effect, rent control grants property rights to renters, that originally belonged to the original property owners. Rent control becomes a redistribution of wealth to rent control tenants away from apartment owners, market apartment renters, and newcomers to the area. Nonetheless, over time the quality of life decreases for all residents of a city where rent control is imposed. Solutions So, it […]

Video: Both Sides of Proposition 98

With the referendum approaching, the debate over rent control is heating up in California. This video is pretty balanced in showing both sides. There are some memorable quotes, like “social security and pension plan would not pay the market rent, so I just wouldn’t eat.” I guess this guy values his $375/mo apartment over food. Or the pro-rent-control activist who says, “If you can’t find a place now, what will it be like if we lose rent control?” Another says, “Economically, this would be devastating.” I encourage them to take microeconomics, but I think economics was banned in San Francisco. Was that Proposition 76?

Rent Control Part 3: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development and Class Conflict

Part One of this series was a refresher on the Microeconomics of Rent Control and touched on how it encourages hoarding Part Two discussed rent controls influence on the black market for apartments, rental property deterioration and housing discrimination. Here in Part Three, we will discuss how rent control hampers mobility, regional growth, tax revenue, apartment development, and becomes a catalyst for class conflict. Mobility As mentioned in Rent Control Part One, duration of residence in a rent-controlled apartment has been observed to be three times as long as duration at market-rate apartments. One can see that the incentive to hoard rent-controlled apartments is also disincentive to relocate. The mobility of both the tenants and newcomers are drastically hampered by rent control. Unless the tenant has the money to rent a second apartment (or Governor’s mansion), it will be difficult for him to relocate closer to better employment. The tenant may rather endure a very long commute in order to maintain the rent-controlled apartment. As Walter Block put it, "They are, in a sense, trapped by the gentle and visible hand that keeps them where they are rather than where they might do better." Difficulties are multiplied if the local economy takes a turn for the worse. A downturn in local employment would not be relieved by people relocating for jobs, thus making the unemployment and poverty situation worse. Employees looking to relocate in the city with rent control are hurt the worst as they will have a difficult time finding available apartments. The drawbacks to the local economy are discussed in the section on regional growth and adaptation. The reduction in mobility is especially burdensome on families with children, since public schools tend to be local. If the local school is under performing, a family under rent-control will lose […]

Rent Control Part 2: Black Market, Deterioration and Discrimination

With New York’s new Governor’s rent subsidized by his landlord and California debating the best ways to end rent control through Proposition 98, I thought it was a good opportunity to discuss the negative aspects of rent control. This post is the second in a four part series on the rent control. Read all four posts: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions Black Market and Deceptive Acts As current renters hoard their rent-controlled apartments, it is rare that new apartments become available. Sometimes, tenants would illegally sublet their units at higher rents. Landlords do under-the table deals or rent to friends and family. New York had to crack down on landlords charging “key fees” as high as several thousand dollars to new renters. Landlords will often find loopholes that will let them de-regulate a building, just to be released of the financial burdens. For example, in NY landlords will take their rent-controlled building and deregulate it by using the entire building as a residence for a certain number of years. This is space that could otherwise have been rented at a market rate. Deterioration of Existing Housing Stock Because of the disincentive to improve and maintain the property, landlords will often become slumlords and allow unhealthy conditions or activities to take place in the apartments. This lack of improvement not only is unpleasant to the current renter, but accelerates the end of the usable life of the aparment building. The Rand Corporation studied Los Angeles’ rent control law and found that 63 percent of the benefit of lowered rents was offset by a loss in available housing related to deterioration and […]

Rent Control Part 1: Microeconomics Lesson & Hoarding

This post has been released as the first in a four part series: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hoarding Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part Four: Conclusion and Solutions Opposition to rent control among economists spans the political spectrum, including over 90% of American and Canadian economists.  In fact, Swedish socialist Economist Assar Lindbeck famously said, “In many cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city—except for bombing it.” (Assar Lindbeck, The Political Economy of the New Left, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 39) Without getting into the morality of restrictions on property rights, I will discuss the more subtle consequences of rent control over a series of posts. Quick Microeconomics Lesson: As stated by the National Multi Housing Council: Rents serve two functions essential to the efficient operation of housing markets: they compensate providers of existing housing units and developers of new units for the cost of providing shelter to consumers; and they provide the economic incentives needed to attract new investment in rental housing, as well as to maintain existing housing stock. In this respect, housing is no different from other commodities, such as food and clothing — the amount producers supply is directly related to the prevailing market price. Those of us who have studied microeconomics understand the near-universally accepted supply/demand consequence of rent-control: a decrease in the quality and supply of rental housing over time. But, for those who need a refresher or quick intro lesson, Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University and the popular Marginal Revolution blog explains the microeconomics of rent control in this video: When you have some spare time, watch this more […]

Vending Machine Economics in Japan

Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution is in Japan, and is fascinated by the number of vending machines. He takes a minute to ponder on the economics of vending machines in Tokyo. First we must look to the shortage of storage space in homes. I suspect few Japanese want to buy big piles of stuff at Costco. So buy smaller “portions” and in the meantime the inventories are stored in the vending machines, where they are more or less at your disposal. I would also look at the storage space for humans in stores. Shops require expensive ground floor space. If you can eliminate the space the human takes up to manage the store and space shoppers use to enter and browse, you can store more compactly. It’s seems a little counterintuitive to think that the storage space could be more valuable than a human occupant… Bill’s comment led me to add this link to an automat in NYC: BAMN!

University of Chicago Creates Milton Friedman Institute

Crain’s Chicago Business: U of C honors Friedman with $200M center Eventually, the Friedman Institute will be housed in buildings now occupied by the Chicago Theological Seminary on 58th Street between Woodlawn and University avenues. The U of C is buying the buildings and has agreed to build a new home for the seminary at 60th Street and Dorchester Avenue. The seminary is expected to move in 2012 and will lease the building from the U of C for 100 years at a cost of $1 a year. Milton Friedman Institute webpage

How McCain or Obama Can Permanently Eliminate the Gas Tax, Cut Pork and Help the Environment

John McCain and Hillary Clinton have both supported the idea of a “Gas Tax Holiday“. The whole idea of a Holy Day to celebrate the worship of socialized transportation catered by Santa Clinton/McCain seems pretty absurd to me. Nonetheless, they expect pandering to gas-addicted voters to pay off in their election hopes. Unfortunately, such a gas holiday would burden the deficit, incentivize the burning of fossil fuels, and further socialize our transportation system. Highway advocates currently cling to arguments that roads are more “free-market” than transit because the costs of maintaining the highways are paid by the user through gas taxes and user fees. That is a myth to be debunked in future posts, but the argument would be void during McCain’s new “holiday”. And, with future tax money footing the bill instead of gas users, we would have a full blown transfer of wealth from the responsible taxpayers who don’t depend on petroleum to the gas guzzlers and petroleum industry. I propose a more free-market solution at the federal level – get out of the transportation business altogether! The federal government would end the gas tax permanently, but at the same time deed the entire federal highway system over to the individual states where the highways are located, and abolish the Department of Transportation over a span of a few years. The individual states would be free to handle their transportation as they see fit, as long as the they do not diminish the military’s ability to mobilize forces for defense. States could pay for maintenance of the assets in ways that best suit them, whether it be a gas tax, tolls, property taxes or states could actually raise money through complete privatization of the new assets. Besides easing the burden on the deficit, getting the federal government out […]