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Long weekend links

1. The NYT utterly humiliates itself with a story on how difficult it is for a kid straight outta college from “a prominent Portuguese banking family” to rent a $2,500/mo. studio in a Chelsea coop for less than 12 months. Sounds like the perfect posterchild for Sheldon Silver’s rent control plans. 2. What does it cost in bribes to get an 11-story hotel built in Park Slope? $9,850 to Marty Markowitz and 400-space public garage. The developer called the garage a “magnificent cake,” and Irene Lo Re of the Fifth Ave. BID says, “We can’t turn our backs on 400 spaces.” The commenters are throwing a lot of scorn at the developer for the garage, but it looks to me like it’s the fault of Irene Lo Re and the parking-obsessed neighbors. 3. Vancouver considers easing up on “social housing requirement” for developer (for the first time ever?!) if they’ll give the city a few parcels of land. 4. New (again) California Governor Jerry Brown proposes elimination of redevelopment agencies.

LaHood’s revealingly stupid reply to the WaPo’s HSR criticism

The WaPo earlier this week ran an editorial against California high-speed rail, and on Friday ran a response from Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. As the dedicated anti-California HSR blog High-Speed Train Talk says, the letter does a pretty good job of summing up everything that’s wrong with the guy. The letter starts off with this stunningly ignorant comparison to highway building in the 1950s: If President Dwight D. Eisenhower had waited until he had all the cash on hand, all the lines drawn on a map and all the naysayers on board, America wouldn’t have an interstate highway system. And if it didn’t have an interstate highway system, maybe rail transportation wouldn’t have died out in the first place! We also learn that “put[ting] Californians back to work” is “perhaps [the] most important” goal of the project – a candid admission that this project is more about making work for union workers than it is about transportation. This was obvious beforehand – we will, after all, pay double for the HSR trains due to procurement protectionism – but it’s nice to see LaHood finally admit it. And just in case we still harbored any delusions about LaHood’s reasoning skills, he rounds the letter out with this blatant tautology: Focusing the total sum of our federal dollars in one project, as The Post suggests, is a poor strategy that will not serve our long-term goal of creating a national high-speed rail network.

California’s Water Resources vs Development

There are some good articles out there this morning, I want to share them with you… Rationalitate – California developments halted over water While the knee-jerk libertarian reaction might be disgust, I think the markets are probably ruined by the government, and current pricing isn’t what it would be in a market setting. UCLA professor Edward Leamer corroborates this, saying “[w]ater has been seriously under-priced in California.” So, the plan would have an effect similar to a liberalization: increased barriers on sprawling development. But obviously it’s only a nudge in the right direction, and is a woefully inadequate mechanism compared to outright liberalization of water resources. Is it possible to liberalize the water market, which would be the ideal solution?

Somin: Causes of the Defeat of Prop 98

Ilya Somin at Volokh – Causes of the Defeat of Proposition 98 There were two major causes of Prop 98’s defeat. One was the sponsors’ mistake in combining the popular cause of restricting eminent domain with a far less popular phaseout of rent control. The second and more unusual cause of 98’s defeat was the presence of Proposition 99 on the ballot. If you are interested in this, please check out Ilya Somin’s extensive writings on Proposition 98 and 99 at The Volokh Conspiracy.

Somin: Prop 99 Worse Than Nothing

Ilya Somin at Volokh: Why California’s Proposition 99 is a Lot Worse than Nothing Yesterday’s California returns show that Proposition 98 – the referendum initiative that would have imposed real restrictions on eminent domain and also phased out rent control – has been overwhelmingly defeated by a 61% to 39% margin. The rival Proposition 99 – an initiative sponsored by local governments and other pro-condemnation interests that only pretends to protect property rights – passed easily by 62 to 38.

Somin: Prop 98 Likely to Fail, 99 to Pass

Ilya Somin at Volokh: Polls on California Eminent Domain Ballot Initiatives Show Prop 98 Likely to Fail and Prop 99 Likely to Pass: In a recent Field Poll cited in the article, Proposition 98 was losing by 43 to 33 percent among “likely voters,” while Proposition 99 was ahead by 48 to 30 percent. A slightly earlier poll conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California has similar results. If, as is likely, Proposition 98 is defeated, it will probably be a result of the combination of the sponsors’ tactical error in combining the popular anti-eminent domain measure with a far less popular phaseout of rent control (a mistake I criticized in one of my earlier posts), combined with the presence of the deceptive Prop 99 on the ballot. The latter probably led voters to believe that they could protect property rights against takings without simultaneously attacking rent control. Keep your fingers crossed….

Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions

Welcome to the final post in the series discussing the consequences of rent control. Thank you to the subscribers who have patiently awaited each new post. I hope everyone found it enlightening. If you haven’t read the entire series, you can catch up with these links: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Conclusion Rent control is not just a simple price control setting the price at which willing renters and landlords are permitted to do business, it is much worse.  It is a coercive act that gives landlords no legal option, but to rent to a tenant against his will, often at a financial loss.  Rent control adds a non-voluntary burden to landlords which deepens over time because landlords do not have the option to rent to a tenant at below market rates.  Not only does rent control cause huge distortions in the housing market, but the burdens fall disproportionately on the poor and underprivileged people it was intended to benefit. Although particular people are able to live with the comfort of low rent payments, even those renters will see their living conditions deteriorate as landlords neglect repairs and maintenance. As the situation gets worse, middle class residents are able to move away, leaving behind the poorest residents who have become reliant on the reduced rent. In effect, rent control grants property rights to renters, that originally belonged to the original property owners. Rent control becomes a redistribution of wealth to rent control tenants away from apartment owners, market apartment renters, and newcomers to the area. Nonetheless, over time the quality of life decreases for all residents of a city where rent control is imposed. Solutions So, it […]

Video: Both Sides of Proposition 98

With the referendum approaching, the debate over rent control is heating up in California. This video is pretty balanced in showing both sides. There are some memorable quotes, like “social security and pension plan would not pay the market rent, so I just wouldn’t eat.” I guess this guy values his $375/mo apartment over food. Or the pro-rent-control activist who says, “If you can’t find a place now, what will it be like if we lose rent control?” Another says, “Economically, this would be devastating.” I encourage them to take microeconomics, but I think economics was banned in San Francisco. Was that Proposition 76?

Rent Control Part 2: Black Market, Deterioration and Discrimination

With New York’s new Governor’s rent subsidized by his landlord and California debating the best ways to end rent control through Proposition 98, I thought it was a good opportunity to discuss the negative aspects of rent control. This post is the second in a four part series on the rent control. Read all four posts: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hording Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part 4: Conclusion and Solutions Black Market and Deceptive Acts As current renters hoard their rent-controlled apartments, it is rare that new apartments become available. Sometimes, tenants would illegally sublet their units at higher rents. Landlords do under-the table deals or rent to friends and family. New York had to crack down on landlords charging “key fees” as high as several thousand dollars to new renters. Landlords will often find loopholes that will let them de-regulate a building, just to be released of the financial burdens. For example, in NY landlords will take their rent-controlled building and deregulate it by using the entire building as a residence for a certain number of years. This is space that could otherwise have been rented at a market rate. Deterioration of Existing Housing Stock Because of the disincentive to improve and maintain the property, landlords will often become slumlords and allow unhealthy conditions or activities to take place in the apartments. This lack of improvement not only is unpleasant to the current renter, but accelerates the end of the usable life of the aparment building. The Rand Corporation studied Los Angeles’ rent control law and found that 63 percent of the benefit of lowered rents was offset by a loss in available housing related to deterioration and […]

Rent Control Part 1: Microeconomics Lesson & Hoarding

This post has been released as the first in a four part series: Rent Control Part One: Microeconomics Lesson and Hoarding Rent Control Part Two: Black Market, Deterioration, and Discrimination Rent Control Part Three: Mobility, Regional Growth, Development, and Class Conflict Rent Control Part Four: Conclusion and Solutions Opposition to rent control among economists spans the political spectrum, including over 90% of American and Canadian economists.  In fact, Swedish socialist Economist Assar Lindbeck famously said, “In many cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city—except for bombing it.” (Assar Lindbeck, The Political Economy of the New Left, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, p. 39) Without getting into the morality of restrictions on property rights, I will discuss the more subtle consequences of rent control over a series of posts. Quick Microeconomics Lesson: As stated by the National Multi Housing Council: Rents serve two functions essential to the efficient operation of housing markets: they compensate providers of existing housing units and developers of new units for the cost of providing shelter to consumers; and they provide the economic incentives needed to attract new investment in rental housing, as well as to maintain existing housing stock. In this respect, housing is no different from other commodities, such as food and clothing — the amount producers supply is directly related to the prevailing market price. Those of us who have studied microeconomics understand the near-universally accepted supply/demand consequence of rent-control: a decrease in the quality and supply of rental housing over time. But, for those who need a refresher or quick intro lesson, Professor Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University and the popular Marginal Revolution blog explains the microeconomics of rent control in this video: When you have some spare time, watch this more […]

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