Category rent control

Market Affordable

Check out my new post at Metropolitan Abundance Project: How “inclusionary” are market-rate rentals? In metropolitan Baltimore, a family of four making $73,000 in 2024 qualifies for 60% AMI affordable housing, where it would pay $1,825 per month for rent, utilities included. A third of new market-rate three-bedroom units in Baltimore are rented at around that level.Baltimore is typical, as it turns out. In most U.S. metro areas, a substantial share of rentals constructed since 2010 were, in 2021 and 2022, affordable at 60% of AMI… You can also check out maps showing rentals affordable at 80% and 120% of AMI. The ACS data don’t let me distinguish market-rate from subsidized rentals, so these include LIHTC and other subsidized rentals. Those, however, can’t explain away the core result, and the data don’t show the bifurcated market that some people imagine, with a huge gap between market and deed-restricted rents.

Poor People Move Too

It is well known that rent control is not particularly effective in controlling rents; cities like New York and San Francisco have rent control and yet are quite expensive. Supporters of rent control, however, often argue that rent control is valuable for a different reason: it makes housing more stable, by making it more difficult for a tenant to be evicted for nonpayment of rent. But it seems to me that there’s an assumption hidden behind this idea: that the neediest people are the ones who are ordinarily most stable, and thus do not suffer from rising housing costs as long as they are protected by rent control or similar measures. For example, law professor Richard Schragger complains that pro-housing zoning reform will “redound to the benefits of investors and developers and not to those residents with limited resources who seek to afford to remain in place.” (emphasis added) In the next sentence, he adds that “those in the market for housing- including middle-class families, recent college graduates, and young families– are often priced out of high-cost urban markets. But reforms should be careful not to equate their interests with those of the working class and especially minority poor…” (emphasis added)* In other words, the “working class” and “minority poor” and people “in the market for housing” are somehow two separate groups. This assumption might be persuasive if poor people moved less often than other people. But neither common sense nor data support this idea. If you are poor, you might be less likely to have steady employment, which means that your income is likely to be unstable. Thus, you are more likely than other Americans to be evicted or to move voluntarily even if rents are stable. Even if you rely on government transfer payments, you are at risk […]

The fallacy of total rent regulation

One of the most-common beliefs many leftists in America hold is that the staggering increase in apartment rents is not a result of not building enough supply but rather a combination of greedy landlords, corporations buying out rental properties, and landlords intentionally keeping units vacant to drive up prices. Take for example this recent post by my former San Francisco supervisor, the socialist Dean Preston. He claims that San Francisco could become affordable within a year, and proposes a set of regulations to be imposed on the rental market.  How to you allocate housing? But these regulations have one fatal flaw. San Francisco is a very attractive city. Even if the economy is worse than it used to be, the culture, geographical location and climate make it a place where thousands of people would love to live, and are currently blocked only by the high rental prices. If you artificially lower these prices (through legislation), you end up with way more demand that the supply can handle. Even if you think this is morally the right thing to do, you have to address the mismatch between the demand and supply you’re creating.  In other words: how will you allocate housing in the absence of the market mechanism?  When confronted with this question, American leftists usually do not have an answer, or provide some muddy explanation that still focuses on existing residents, as if their living situation was never changing: they never got married, divorced, their kids never grow up, they never leave for a reason other than being priced out etc., and as if there were no new potential residents who would like to move to San Francisco for whatever reason.  History provides a warning In the absence of their answer, we can look at history. In the Eastern Bloc […]

New and Noteworthy: Randy Shaw’s Generation Priced Out

In Generation Priced Out, housing activist Randy Shaw writes a book about the rent crisis for non-experts.  Shaw’s point of view is that of a left-wing YIMBY: that is, he favors allowing lots of new market-rate housing, but also favors a variety of less market-oriented policies to prevent displacement of low-income renters (such as rent control, and more generally policies that make it difficult to evict tenants). What I liked most about this breezy, easy-to-read book is that it rebuts a wide variety of anti-housing arguments. For example, NIMBYs sometimes argue that new housing displaces affordable older housing. But Shaw shows that NIMBY homeowners oppose apartment buildings even when this is not the case; apartments built on parking lots and vacant lots are often controversial. For example, in Venice, California, NIMBYs opposed “building 136 supportive housing units for low-income people on an unsightly city-owned parking lot.” NIMBYs may argue that new housing will always be for the rich. But Shaw cites numerous examples of NIMBYs opposing public housing for the poor as well as market-rate housing for the middle and upper classes. NIMBYs also claim that they seek to protect their communities should be protected against skyscrapers or other unusually large buildings. But Shaw shows that NIMBYs have fought even the smallest apartment buildings. For example, in Berkeley, NIMBYs persuaded the city to reject a developer’s plan to add only three houses to a lot. On the other hand, market urbanists may disagree with Shaw’s advocacy of a wide variety of policies that he refers to as “tenant protections” such as rent control, inclusionary zoning, increased code enforcement, and generally making it difficult to evict tenants.   All of these policies make it more difficult and/or expensive to be a landlord, thus creating costs that may either be passed on to tenants […]

Rent Control Makes It Harder to Vote with Your Feet

One advantage of a federal system is enabling people ill-treated by one government body to “vote with their feet” toward less abusive jurisdictions. That escape valve is one rationale for reserving some political policy determination for state rather than national government, or to local rather than state government. However, devolving political power to lower level governments does not serve citizens’ rights when it comes to rent control, because rent control paralyzes owners’ ability to escape imposed burdens by voting with their feet. Virtually every rent control story focuses on local government policies. Less well known, however, is that a majority of states actually ban or restrict local governments’ power to impose rent control. And currently, in at least four states (California, Oregon, Washington, and Illinois), those restrictions are under attack. Municipalities want power they are currently denied so they can impose rent control, supposedly to give local citizens “what they want.” That raises the question of whether rent control policy should be vested at the state level or the local level. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Local Governance In many circumstances, the option to vote with your feet favors local governance. It is generally less costly to leave a small local government jurisdiction whose benefits are not worth the cost, than it is to leave a similarly bad state government jurisdiction. By the same token, it is less costly to leave a state than it is to leave the country. The enhanced exit options provided at a more local level may better protect citizens’ rights. Citizens’ ability to cheaply leave smaller jurisdictions more tightly limits government’s ability to use them as cash cows rather than serve them better. This is true of sales and income taxes, for example. Dissatisfied residents can avoid those burdens by going somewhere […]

Rent Control Again

A blog post in Pacific Standard seeks to defend rent control- an idea that, as the author admits, is generally detested by economists. The author writes that “rent regulations give tenants a greater stake in their community and incentivize them to put time, energy, and even money into their homes.” But that’s not necessarily a good thing- in a heavily regulated market, a “stake in the community” means that tenants, like homeowners, have an incentive to engage in NIMBYism. So in a prosperous area rent control hits housing supply with a double whammy- more recruits for the NIMBY army AND less incentive for landlords to invest in housing. He also endorses the “Unlimited Demand” theory, acknowledging the argument that building more market rate housing creates more affordable housing eventually, but responds: “not in tight markets like Silicon Valley and New York City. ” This claim is of course a self-fulfilling prophecy: people use it to justify opposing new housing, which in turn ensures that supply can never meet demand.  (I critique the argument in more detail here). However, the article does contain one non-silly argument: that rent-controlled cities do occasionally experience building booms (most notably New York in the 1950s).  Rent control is a factor relating to housing supply, but not the only one. So here’s my modest proposal for pro-regulation politicians: a city can adopt rent control to protect existing tenants, as long as they deregulate in other ways in order to promote new construction.   So for example, a state law could provide that municipalities could adopt rent control under one condition: no more exclusion of new housing.  So if San Mateo County wants to adopt rent control, they can do it as long as all new housing is exempt from all of the city’s use and density restrictions. The […]

The Sheer Craziness Of New York City’s Rent Stabilization Mandates

Recently, I met someone who was trapped in a terrible apartment.  Why “trapped”?  For months (if not years) she had been in an adversarial relationship with both her landlord and her neighbors, but she can’t quite bring herself to leave.  Why not? First, she is in a rent-stabilized apartment, and is afraid to give that up because such units are hard to find.  Second, because of rent stabilization, she had made the sort of capital investments in her apartment–such as repairs–that are normally made by landlords, but neglected when they are overseeing these price controlled units. By contrast, in a normal city, my friend’s dysfunctional relationship with her apartment would have ended long ago: either the landlord would have evicted her (something very difficult in New York), or she would have moved to someplace less atrocious.

The Psychological Consequences Of Rent Control

The University of Chicago Press has published a “definitive” edition of F. A. Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty under the editorial guidance of long-time Hayek scholar Ronald Hamowy. Given my interest in urban issues, it’s a good time for me to focus on chapter 22, “Housing and Town Planning.” It has several insights that I really like, but given the constraints of this column, for now I’ll talk about Hayek’s take on rent control. I must confess that it was several years after I became interested in the nature and significance of cities that I learned that Hayek had written anything on what we in the United States call “urban planning.”  (Well, that’s not quite true; I did read The Constitution of Liberty as a graduate student, but in those days I didn’t appreciate how important cities are to both economic and intellectual development, so it evidently made no impression on me.)  The analysis has a characteristically “Hayekian” flavor to it, by which I mean he goes beyond purely economic analysis and points out the psychological and sociological impact of certain urban policies that reinforce the dynamics of interventionism. The Economics of Rent Control Hayek’s economic analysis of rent control sounds familiar to modern students of political economy perhaps because it’s so widely (though not universally) accepted.  This was hardly the case in 1960, when his book was first published.  Hayek points out that despite the good intentions of those who support it, “any fixing of rents below the market price inevitably perpetuates the housing shortage.”  That’s because at the artificially low rents the quantity demanded exceeds the quantity supplied. One effect of the chronic housing shortage that rent control produces is a drop in the rate at which apartments and flats would normally turn over.  Instead, rent-controlled housing becomes […]