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If this season’s political campaign rhetoric has demonstrated anything, it’s that governors love to take credit for job creation. What I haven’t seen any governor mention, though, is that there is huge opportunity for economic growth in relaxing zoning codes. Most obviously, allowing new opportunities for infill development will create construction jobs. More significantly though, in the long run, cities allow for faster economic growth (and job growth) than other locations. The regulations that prevent cities from growing keep economic progress below what it otherwise would be. While researchers disagree over whether population density or total population is the variable that is most significantly correlated with economic growth, either way zoning plays an important role in holding back job growth, providing policymakers who are willing to deregulate with opportunities to improve their competitive standings next to other cities. Political incentives stand in the way of this growth opportunity, however. Most zoning restrictions benefit a city’s current residents at the expense of potential residents. For example, minimum lot size requirements serve to raise the price of homes, preventing low-income people from moving into neighborhoods that current residents wish to keep exclusive. By changing this current order, policymakers risk losing the support of their homeowning constituents, and interest likely to be better organized than renters and potential city residents. Limitations on housing supply raise the value of existing homes, artificially raising the value of residents’ assets, which homeowners strongly fight to protect. At the local level, policymakers are therefore incentivized to privilege homeowners’ interests at the expense of broad economic growth. At the state level however, the incentives may be different, such that economic growth may benefit state policymakers more than protecting home values. State policymakers have constituents who live in a wide variety of municipalities, some where land use restrictions are less binding in […]
Wendell Cox has received his fair share of criticism from this blog, but his post last week about Tokyo’s surprising lack of density is very interesting. Sure, Tokyo’s suburbs are dense enough to be connected by job centers by rail, but the core is almost completely low- and lower-mid-rise, and thus not very dense: Tokyo does not have intensely dense central areas. The ku area [historic core] has a density of 37,300 per square mile (14,400 per square kilometer). This is well below the densities of Manhattan (69,000 & 27,000) and the ville de Paris (51,000 & 21,000). Only one of the ku (Toshima) exceeds the density of Paris. And then the suburbs themselves aren’t as compact as they could be: Further, according to the Japan House and Land Survey of 2008, Tokyo has a large stock of detached houses, by definition lower density. Nearly 45 percent of the Tokyo region’s housing is detached. One-third of the dwellings within 30 kilometers (18 miles) of the core are detached. This figure rises to more than 60 percent outside 30 kilometers from the core and 85 percent between 60 and 70 kilometers (37-43 kilometers) from the core (Figure 2). Some might see this as a validation of New Urbanism (which is sort of a bastardization of Old Urbanism), whose response to tall building enthusiasts like myself, Ed Glaeser, and Alon Levy is that “dense doesn’t have to mean tall.” And it’s true – Tokyo manages a relatively high density with very few tall buildings. But there are costs that Tokyo bears for its lack of height and downtown density. First and foremost are the high housing prices. Imagine New York City if Midtown and the Upper East and West Sides were still tenement neighborhoods, and everyone living and working above the sixth floor […]
Earlier today I posted the video of the Cato discussion on housing with Randal O’Toole, Ryan Avent, Adam Gordon, and Matt Yglesias, but I wanted to transcribe one segment towards the end. (Like I said, it’s hard to skip to the end of the streaming video because you can’t scroll beyond what’s already been downloaded.). For the last question, someone from the audience says he’s a fan of Randal’s who lives in DC, and asks Randal, and the rest of the panelists, what they about the recent calls to lift the city’s height limit in response to development pressures. Randal responds first: Well this is where I think the policy questions [and the difference between Randal and the other panelists] come in on density. I think we ‘ve got Maryland, which has all these restrictions on supposedly protecting agricultural land, we have Loudoun County and other counties in Virginia that have zoned most of their land for 20-acre large lot sizes, those have restricted the ability of people to live in single-family, to build new single-family homes in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. And so it’s created a pressure for more density in Washington, DC, but if you didn’t have those suburban restrictions, you wouldn’t have that pressure for density in Washington, DC. So I’d say, let’s get rid of the suburban restrictions, and then see if there really is a demand for high-density high-rise in Washington. If there really was a demand, there’s a lot of three-story buildings that could be redeveloped to be six and seven stories if you wanted to. Matt: “You’re not allowed to!” Ryan: “You should try to do that – if you can make it happen, then that would be a great profit opportunity.” Randal: “Well, I’ve seen streets of row houses here [in DC] […]
The debate you’ve been waiting for! Randal O’Toole, Matt Yglesias, Ryan Avent, and Adam Gordon participated yesterday in a discussion at the Cato Institute moderated by Diana Lind from Next American City/Forefront. (How had this never happened before??) Randal O’Toole did not disappoint, arriving in top form in his shoestring necktie and armed with a surprisingly interesting Powerpoint, but I think New Jersey-based attorney Adam Gordon stole the show with his discussion of inclusionary zoning and the Mt. Laurel doctrine (probably because he was on the only one on stage who hasn’t already spewed hundreds of thousands of words on the subject). You can download the 90-minute discussion as an MP3 from Cato (much easier to scroll through), or watch the video streaming:
This semester I took an econometrics class because I got an MA with the bare minimum of quantitative classes. For the class, I wrote a paper asking the question, “Are consumers willing to pay a premium to live in dense urban areas?” It’s easy to see that urban density is correlated with higher housing prices, but this could come from many factors such as people having to live in dense cities to find jobs or to earn higher salaries or from supply restrictions that impact dense cities more than suburbs. As a proxy for cities’ urban qualities, I used Walk Score. Walk Score is based on residential distance to amenities, block length, and road connectivity and ranks cities on a scales of 100. It is designed to test the feasibility of living in a city without a car, but it excludes some factors that are often considered relevant to facilitating pedestrianism, including street width, sidewalk width, and population density. Still, I think Walk Score provides a pretty good measure of a city’s urbanist quality. The correlation between Walk Score and median house price is pretty striking: To test demand for urban living, I wanted to control for the economic factors that drive demand to live in a given city. I tested the impact of Walk Score on median house prices controlling for household income, unemployment, and cost of living. The sample includes 259 cities for which I had Walk Score data and house price data from Kiplinger. The results suggest that for a one-point increase in Walk Score, we can expect a .5% increase in a cities’ median house price, and this result is statistically significant. In another way of measuring the same question (an IV regression using the year the city was founded as the instrument), I found that a one-point […]
The most recent installment of the American Enterprise Institute’s series Society and Culture Outlook features a piece about the role of urban design in how people use cities. The article “A plea for beauty: a manifesto for a new urbanism” by Roger Scruton is a deviation from AEI’s typically conservative view toward central planning. Scruton favors heavy-handed planning of the appearance of the built environment, essentially advocating for strict form-based zoning codes: Many suggestions have been made as to how an attraction to the center might be generated. Building downtown convention centers, expensive museums, and concert halls; offering tax credits for city-center businesses; creating enterprise zones; and removing some of the regulations that make living, moving, and trading downtown so difficult have all been tried, and none has worked. And the reason they do not work is because they are addressing symptoms instead of causes. People flee from city centers because they do not like city centers. And they do not like city centers because they are alienating, ugly, and without a human face. Or rather, they do not like city centers when they are alienating, ugly, and inhuman, the normal case in America. [. . .] The proof of this is easy to find in the old cities of Europe. People choose to live in the center of Paris, Rome, Prague, or London rather than the periphery. Others who do not live in those cities want to spend their vacations there to enjoy the culture, entertainment, and beauty of their surroundings. These are flourishing cities, in which people of every class and occupation live side by side in mutual dependency while maintaining the distance that is one of the great gifts of the urban way of life. And there is a simple explanation for this: People wish to live […]
In the comments of a previous post, readers discussed the incentives facing different types of landowners whose properties are facing potential upzoning, demonstrating just how complicated the relationship between land use regulations and property values is. As I see it, theory tells us that upzoning will increase the value of much of the land that will be redeveloped by opening up options for the developer to put the land to a higher valued use. However, land that is not economically viable for redevelopment and perhaps some land near this margin would fall in value due to the increased supply permitted. The example from the earlier post was a proposal for upzoning in Hollywood. I would think that plenty of properties there would be ripe for redevelopment, as single family zoning is constricting supply to well below the market clearing level. If this is true, many homeowners would stand to receive a windfall with upzoning. I’m not very familiar with Los Angeles, but I’d think it likely that owners on the periphery of the area to be upzoned could potentially lose money, as the supply of housing would increase in the most desirable parts of Hollywood, devaluing homes in the less desirable areas. In the comments, awp provided clear analysis of what’s going on in this situation: The excess “rent” comes from having a part of a limited SUPPLY. Any one individual would be able to increase their portion of the “rent” by being the only one allowed to increase their supply, while lowering the total “rent” through the increase in SUPPLY. If the zoning is removed there will be no remaining excess “rent”. It would take some serious analysis that I have never seen to figure who would benefit the by moving from a zoning regime to a free market regime. […]
In the first post of this little series, I addressed the problems of top down land use regulation through the lens of Austrian economics. Because cities contain public space and infrastructure that is used by many residents and cannot be bought and sold in the way that many goods can be, Alon Levy suggests turning to collective choice to solve these problems. I will agree that collective choice, or its close cousin communal property rights can be employed well in cities. For example, business improvement districts can work together to undertake projects that would not be worthwhile for any business to take individually, benefitting themselves and their customers in the process. Similarly, these voluntary and emergent organizations can emerge among homeowners or neighborhoods, circumventing some of the coordination problems involved within communities. In a future post, I will go into further detail about the benefits of these types of organizations, whether they’re formal or informal. But now, I want to point out the problems of collective choice when carried out through legislation or land use regulation. As Alon points out, collective choice is inherently biased toward favoring a city’s or neighborhood’s current residents, against potential future residents. This makes policies created through collective choice inherently anti-density and anti-growth. It also means that cities come with a built-in vested interest that wants to protect their property. When planning departments allow this group to protect their interest through the political process, the market process is stifled because entrepreneurs cannot take advantage of available profit opportunities to increase urban density. Furthermore, collective choice leads to many unholy alliances, such as NIMBYs and historic preservationists, NIMBYs and environmentalists who want to protect open space, NIMBYs and those opposed to new transit projects, etc. In other words, collective choice leads to many of the results that urbanists criticize. […]
In a post about the tendency for emergent urbanists to promote the idea of cities having a single equilibrium, Alon Levy recently wrote that collective choice is the best manner for determining urban form. Many urbanists accept that some of the top-down regulations that limit density or use are detrimental to cities, but they often stop short of suggesting that land use regulation should be abolished and transportation privatized, which I will support here with arguments based in Austrian economics. This post does not get to a critique of the collective choice that Alon supports; later entries in this market process series will address both the problems of creating urban policy through collective choice, and some of the institutions that have emerged within civil society that are essential to cities and their residents. The cohort of economists and urbanists who support the elimination of land use regulation is small because cities present all of the problems that neoclassical and Keynesian economists describe as market failures, including externalities, high transaction costs involved in Coasean bargaining, non-excludable goods, etc. However, I believe that emergent solutions solve these problems more effectively than either central planning or collective decision making that becomes law, and the failed and inefficient government projects that urbanist bloggers write about everyday suggest that government failure is no trivial concern. The first reason that regulation is a poor tool to for determining urban form comes from Friedrich Hayek. He clearly identified the calculation problem inherent in central planning: the information necessary to coordinate markets (including land use markets) is held by individuals with “particular knowledge of time and place.” Even assuming that urban planners are benevolent and seek to provide the best outcomes for their communities, they could never compile the knowledge necessary to determine what those outcomes are. Jane […]
In Chevy Chase, MD county planners have revised plans for the Chevy Chase Lake Sector from high rise, mixed-use development to low-rise, primarily residential buildings. The trigger to allow for higher-density development will be the arrival of the Purple Line, a proposed light rail that would stretch across Metro’s Red Line. The light rail would connect Bethesda directly to New Carollton. Construction is scheduled to be completed by 2020, but I for one am not betting on a light rail by that time. For one, no funding has been secured, and for another reason the project is met with considerable opposition to NIMBY-ists in Bethesda and Silver Spring. The town of Chevy Chase has been the most vocal opponent of the project. Personally, I could see the Purple Line being very well-used, and potentially coming closer to profitability than the “cherry blossom” line. However, waiting for the arrival of transit to permit Transit Oriented Development creates a chicken and egg problem. When high-density development is not allowed where there is demand for it, the restriction limits potential for other viable transit options. For example increasing density along the proposed Purple Line could allow for a Circulator or increased MTA routes to provide service in the meantime. And opposition to the light rail is likely to remain strong as long as residents don’t see the clear value of mass transit in their municipalities.