Category NIMBYism

Response to “Steelmanning the NIMBYs”

Scott Alexander, a West Coast blogger, has written a post that has received a lot of buzz, called  “Steelmanning the NIMBYs”; apparently, “steelmanning” is the opposite of “straw manning”; that is, it involves making the best possible case for an argument you don’t really support.  There have been so many comments to this post that I don’t feel the need to respond to every point (and many of the points are very San Francisco-specific).   But here are a few points, each of which begin with a quote from Alexander:  “Even in the best case scenario, increased housing supply will just make apartments slightly more affordable.”  But the post states that if housing supply increases by the admittedly ambitious 2.5 percent a year, the monthly rent for a one bedroom San Francisco apartment will go down from $3500 to $2100- a forty percent decrease.   Moreover, in looking at the effects of new supply it isn’t enough to compare the benefits of reform to the status quo, because it is quite possible that if we continue “business as usual” policies rents will keep rising.  So instead of comparing $2100 to the current rent, maybe we should compare it to whatever the rent will be if San Francisco continues along its current path (which I am guessing is more than $3500).  “If your theory predicts that turning a city into Manhattan will make rents plummet, then consider that turning Manhattan into Manhattan made rents much worse, and so maybe your theory is wrong.”  This is another version of the theory that density causes rent to rise.  I have responded to that argument here. (Brief summary: Manhattan has gotten LESS dense over time, so if density was bad for rent, Manhattan should be a bargain now!) “And I have heard YIMBYs counter that if people don’t want […]

Housing Still Suffers the Same Ills That Caused the Great Recession—Just Not the Ones You Think

If you type “housing crisis” into Google search, “2008” is no longer the first result. The subprime mortgage crisis that toppled the global economy just a decade ago has been supplanted on Google trends by “housing crisis 2018.” This time, the crisis isn’t an overabundance of housing; it’s a chronic housing shortage. But economist Kevin Erdmann argues that the 2018 housing crisis is just the second act of the same tragedy. With local governments issuing fewer building permits and millennials beginning to buy their first homes, millions of Americans struggle to find affordable housing in 2018. The crisis is arguably the worst in California, where about one-third of all city-dwellers cannot afford local rents in every city in the state, San Diego to Sacramento. Economists and policy experts that study housing largely agree that the chronic unaffordability of American housing stems from persistent shortages in the quantity of housing supplied relative to the quantity demanded. Most housing scholars agree that “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) zoning laws are to blame. In many areas, NIMBY zoning laws have prevented developers from building multifamily housing in residential areas or forced developers to adhere to mandated minimum lot sizes. What resemblance, then, does our world of NIMBY-induced housing shortages have to do with the pre-2008 world with fast-and-loose credit policies [pdf] and overbuilt McMansions? That pre-2008 world, Erdmann argues, doesn’t really exist. [pdf] The traditional loose credit story is an easy one to tell––it appeals to populist sentiments (by demonizing rich bankers) and exudes the moral weight of an anti-capitalist parable about greed and gluttony. It makes for a great movie, “The Big Short.”And, to its credit, the traditional credit story even seems to explain much of the financial bedlam of 2008. Banks and investors placed too much confidence in risky mortgage-backed assets, […]

Light and Air, Sound and Fury; or, Was the Equitable Life Building Panic Only About Shadows?

Equitable Life Building from the street. It's imposing!

When I first became interested in urban planning, I believed a piece of professional mythology that went like this: “For all its faults, Euclidean zoning was a well-meaning effort to expand nuisance regulation in the face of the urban industrialization. It was later practitioners who used zoning for selfish and exclusionary purposes.”  While not totally without basis, I now think this view is wrong. Today I would like to show how the iconic example of a nuisance that supposedly motivated Euclidean zoning—the Equitable Life Building in New York City—was in large part controversial because it threatened the interests of existing landlords. The Equitable Life Building at 120 Broadway was completed in 1915. A vanity project of an industrialist—Thomas Coleman duPont—as so many skyscrapers were and are, the projected stood 42-stories high across an entire block without setbacks, adding a startling one and a quarter million square feet of rentable office space to Lower Manhattan. Needless to say, some New Yorkers weren’t happy. But why? The conventional wisdom holds that the Equitable Life Building caused such a stir because it literally cast a shadow over the rest of the neighborhood. Indeed, the building cast a shadow stretching nearly a fifth of a mile across Broadway. But it wasn’t just the shadows that made the Equitable Life Building so uniquely audacious—after all, it wasn’t the tallest building in the neighborhood (this honor would go to the Woolworth Building, completed four years earlier 1912) and it wasn’t the first skyscraper to take up an entire city block without setbacks (by this point, the Flatiron Building was already an icon of the city). Rather, what made the project especially upsetting, on top of standard concerns about light and air, was that it was adding so much floor space at a time when the Lower […]

Mini review: Suburb, by Royce Hanson

Suburb: Planning Politics and the Public Interest is a scholarly book about planning politics in Montgomery County, a (mostly) affluent suburb of Washington, D.C.  The book contains chapters on redevelopment of inner ring, transit-friendly areas such as Friendship Heights and Silver Spring, but also discusses outer suburbs and the county’s agricultural areas. From my perspective, the most interesting section of the book was the chapter on Friendship Heights and Bethesda, two inner-ring areas near subway stops.  When landowners proposed to redevelop these areas, the planning staff actually downzoned them (p. 56)- and NIMBYs fought the planning board, arguing that even more downzoning was necessary to prevent unwelcome development. These downzoning decisions were based on the staff’s “transportation capacity analysis”- the idea that an area’s roads can only support X feet of additional development.  For example, Hanson writes that Friendship Heights “could support only 1.6 million square feet of additional development.” (p. 62).   Similarly, he writes that Bethesda’s “roads and transit could handle only 12 million square feet of new development at an acceptable level of service.” (p. 75) Thus, planning staff artificially limited development based on “level of service “(LOS) .  “Level of service” is a concept used to grade automobile traffic; where traffic is free-flowing the LOS is A.  But the idea that development is inappropriate in low-LOS places seems a bit inconsistent with my experience. Bethesda and Friendship Heights zip codes have about 5000-10,000 people per square mile; many places with far more density seem to function adequately.   For example, Kew Gardens Hills in central Queens has 27,000 people per square mile, relies on bus service, and yet seems to be a moderately popular area. Moreover, the use of LOS to cap density has a variety of other negative effects.  First, places with free-flowing traffic tend to be dangerous for […]

Mini review: Vanishing New York, by Jeremiah Moss

I recently read a highly publicized pro-NIMBY book, Vanishing New York.   The author, who goes by the pen name “Jeremiah Moss” tells a simple story: throughout New York, gentrification and chain stores are on the march, making the city rich and boring.  The story has an element of truth: obviously, there are some places that have gentrified, and there are some places (mostly notably Times Square) that have lots and lots of banks and chain stores. But on balance, the book’s relationship with factual reality is a bit uneven.  Much of the book complains about the evils of gentrification. But in fact, even in Manhattan the poverty rate is 17.9 percent, about three times that of most New York suburbs. Moss also claims that the city is getting whiter, but even Manhattan is 40 percent black and Hispanic, and New York City as a whole is 54 percent black and Hispanic. By contrast, in 1980 the city was only 45 percent black/Hispanic, and in 1940 it was over 90 percent white. Moss seems to think that the city is being taken over by chain stores. The last time I walked through the East Village (one of the neighborhoods he writes about) I found about one or two such stores per block, or about 5 or 10 percent of all storefronts.  My guess is that Moss thinks about chain stores the way many racists think about racial minorities: because they assume one is too many, 5 percent seems to them like a takeover. Moss is all for immigration from foreign nations, but constantly complains about newcomers, especially parents; he uses the word “stroller” like anti-Semites use the term “international bankers”- as a code-word for a dreaded enemy.  He has a problem with college students too (complaining about “NYU’s presence… [having] spread […]

High Rents: Are Construction Costs the Culprit?

(cross-posted from planetizen.com) I have argued numerous times on Planetizen that increased housing supply would reduce rents. I recently read one counterargument that I had not fully addressed before: the claim that no amount of new housing will ever bring down urban rents because housing in high-cost, high-wage cities is expensive to build.* This argument rests on two assumptions: (1) that construction costs are the primary reason some cities are more expensive than others, and (2) if new housing is expensive, the median citywide rent will be equally expensive. I find neither assumption to be persuasive. Admittedly, expensive cities do tend to have higher construction costs than more affordable costs—but this gap is far more modest than the gap in housing costs between high-cost and low-cost cities. For example, a study by the design firm EVStudio showed that the construction costs for a small apartment building in New York City were only about 30 percent higher than the costs of a similar building in Kansas City ($232 per square feet in New York, $181 in Kansas City). But rents in New York are far more than 30 percent higher; I pay about $5 per square foot for my Manhattan apartment, but paid just over $1 per square foot for a roughly comparable apartment in Kansas City (i.e., a doorman building in a fashionable intown neighborhood). Similarly, the Lincoln Institute’s land price database reveals that regional differences in construction costs lag behind differences in land costs: for example, construction costs in San Francisco are only about 60 percent higher than construction costs in Kansas City, but the median San Francisco-area house costs seven times as much due to differences in land costs. Thus, construction costs are not the main reason some cities are more expensive than others.** Moreover, the suggestion that high construction costs for new buildings mean high […]

NIMBY Contradictions

Ever since zoning was invented in the 1920s, homeowners have argued that limits on density and on multifamily housing are necessary to protect property values.  But today, urban NIMBYs seek to prevent new housing on the ground that new housing will lead to gentrification, which will in turn lead to increased property values, which in turn will lead to rising rents and displacement. Similarly, I often read that cities and suburbs shouldn’t have any new housing because they might become “too dense” or “overcrowded.” (Never mind that when there’s not enough housing to go around, excluded residents respond not by leaving the city, but by sleeping on the streets, thus making the city feel even more crowded). But at the same time, I also read that building new housing is futile, because it will all be bought up by foreign oligarchs, who (because they aren’t quite greedy enough to rent out their property) cause the housing to be lifeless and unoccupied.  It is not quite clear to me how the city can be overcrowded and undercrowded at the same time, but evidently this view seems to be common.

(Not So) Infinite Demand

In a recent blog post, Julia Galef has generated a fairly comprehensive list of pro-housing arguments and counterarguments to those arguments. She gives the most detailed consideration to the “infinite demand” argument- in her words, “So even if SF adds a lot of additional housing, prices will still rise almost as quickly as they would have anyway, as long as demand to live here continues to soar. This view is mainly based on examples of other desirable cities, like New York or Singapore, which have built new housing at a faster rate than SF but nevertheless saw steep increases in price.” To which I respond:  New York?  Really?  New York is only pro-housing when compared to San Francisco- which is a bit like saying Iran is a libertarian paradise compared to the Islamic State.  In fact, New York has built housing at a glacial pace.  Between 1960 and 1976, the number of new housing units completed per year ranged from just over 14,000 to over 60,000, and exceeded 20,000 in all but four years. In the almost forty years since 1976, the number of new units exceeded 20,000 in only four years (2006-10) and was above 14,000 for only ten years (1989, 2002, 2004-10, 2015). Meanwhile, demand for housing has increased: between 2006 and 2014 alone, the citywide renter population grew by 600,000. A better example of a “desirable city” would be a city where both the population and the housing supply is growing at a rapid rate- Raleigh, for example, or Las Vegas.  These cities are much cheaper than New York or San Francisco.* Another example of a cheap, permissive city is Tokyo.  But the post suggests Tokyo may not have grown as fast as American cities.  In fact, Tokyo’s regional population grew by 17  percent since 1990- from 32.5 million […]

People Over Process: Why Democracy Doesn’t Justify Exclusion

Some people accept the idea that restrictive land use policy is just as bad as all the research suggests, but persist in supporting the status quo. They argue that if a community chooses to regulate its built environment, that choice should be respected as having moral weight because it’s the outcome of a democratic process. This argument, though, is as logically confused as it is normatively problematic. And in the following few lines, I intend to demonstrate exactly why. No decision making process is value neutral. Whatever way we choose to go about collective decision making, we will always privilege certain voices over others. Institutions beget outcomes and the internal logic of our institutions will always favor some outcomes (and therefore voices) over others. The same individuals with the same preferences asked to make the same decisions through different procedures will produce wildly different outcomes. Imagine a U.S. Presidential election based on the popular vote or representation in the U.S. Senate proportional to state population and you should begin to see how the public will is as much a product of procedure as it is aggregated individual preference. Taking the Bay Area as a land use specific example, our system heavily favors the voices of incumbent homeowners to the detriment of everyone else. Land use decisions take place at the municipal level which–given the fact that we have 101 different municipalities–is a hyper local affair. When a new development is proposed, it only takes a handful of angry neighbors to impact decision making. Were land use set at a higher level of government, the typical number of people that get angry over an individual project would be far less effective at killing new housing. Fifty angry homeowners might matter to the Palo Alto City Council, but they’d be quite a […]

The “Empty House” Theory

One common argument against new urban housing runs as follows: “If we build new housing, it will all be bought up by rich investors who will sit on it.  So new supply doesn’t restrain housing costs.”  This argument (at least as I have phrased it) strikes me as absurd.  Here’s why: for the argument to justify restraining supply, the argument presupposes that if you build 100 new condos/houses/apartments, every single one of them will be bought by an investor, and every single investor will irrationally choose to sit on the unit rather than renting it out.   I can’t prove this is wrong, but it seems really hard to believe.* Even leaving aside the logical weirdness of the argument, it seems to have a questionable factual basis. If there was really a wave of nonresident investors in expensive cities, we might find (1) that the most expensive markets had the highest housing vacancy rates and (2) that these vacancy rates have been rising as housing costs rose.  But Census data suggests otherwise. Here’s some data: (all for central cities, not metros) Expensive 2010 2015 Manhattan 12.7% 13% San Francisco 9.8 7.9 Los Angeles 6.7 6.5 San Diego 7.8 7.1 Boston 9.1 8.0 Not so Expensive 2010 2015 Dallas 12.8% 10.6% Houston 14.0 12.1 Philadelphia 14.1 13.3 Chicago 13.8 13.2 By and large, the expensive cities have lower vacancy rates- exactly what you would expect in a free market.  The only exception is Manhattan.  But it seems to me that if pied-a-terres led to higher rents, Manhattan’s empty-house rate would have climbed as rents did- which does not seem to have been the case. The only way to save the “empty house” theory is to suggest that expensive cities’ empty houses are different from everyone else’s – that is, they are especially […]