Comments on: Bribery for Property Rights: Federal Charges in Chicago

By: Market Urbanism

Market Urbanism — Wed, 28 May 2008 17:35:08 +0000

I agree that it’s a second-best option, but would worry it gives too much incentive to downzone, or would add costs to projects that are already ‘as-of-right’.

By: MarketUrbanism

MarketUrbanism — Wed, 28 May 2008 17:35:00 +0000

I agree that it’s a second-best option, but would worry it gives too much incentive to downzone, or would add costs to projects that are already ‘as-of-right’.

By: Stephen Smith

Stephen Smith — Wed, 28 May 2008 06:09:19 +0000

It’s a second-best option – the best option would be to get rid of the zoning boards to begin with. It would be a pretty radical shift to start thinking of the zoning board as a profit-making entity, and it would be pretty difficult to keep the boards insulated from NIMBY neighbors. So it’s not very realistic, but it would definitely be better than the current system, where you have to have strong personal connections (usually that’s what it takes to bribe someone) to push your projects through.

By: Rationalitate

Rationalitate — Wed, 28 May 2008 06:09:00 +0000

By: Market Urbanism

Market Urbanism — Mon, 26 May 2008 13:59:21 +0000

Aren’t you, in effect, saying that the development rights belong to the municipality until they are bought by the developer?
How would the market price be decided? Would every cubic foot of development rights be for sale? To anyone, or just the owner of the ground?

It would lead to some sort of monopoly-monopoly interaction between the property owner who has a monopoly on the ground and the municipality who has a monopoly on the air.

How wouldn’t it give the municipality the incentive to downzone, in order the sell more rights? Shouldn’t the municipality be forced to pay for all unused air-rights for less dense development?

By: MarketUrbanism

MarketUrbanism — Mon, 26 May 2008 13:59:00 +0000

It would lead to some sort of monopoly-monopoly interaction between the property owner who has a monopoly on the ground and the municipality who has a monopoly on the air.

How wouldn’t it give the municipality the incentive to downzone, in order the sell more rights? Shouldn’t the municipality be forced to pay for all unused air-rights for less dense development?

By: Stephen Smith

Stephen Smith — Mon, 26 May 2008 06:19:55 +0000

This is why zoning boards ought to accept cash payments for the changing of zoning laws. Jonathan Levine describes something like that in his book Zoned Out as an example of Coasean endowment-irrelevance with regards to zoning rights. If zoning rights are tradable (and municipalities act like private corporations, which is a big if), then it shouldn’t matter what the initial zoning regulations are, since any business will be willing to bid up to the total value of their producer surplus to have the rights changed.

By: Rationalitate

Rationalitate — Mon, 26 May 2008 06:19:00 +0000